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I. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Securities regulation in Florida is governed by chapter 517 of the
Florida Statutes and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder by
the Florida Department of Banking and Finance Division of Securities.' In
1992-93, three bills were adopted which amended or added to chapter 517.
These are chapters 92-9, 92-45 and 92-198.2
* © 1993 Jeffrey Winikoff and Maxine Bradford. The authors wish to express their
gratitude to Craig D. Stein for his assistance and research in the preparation of this paper.
** Mr. Winikoff, a member of the Florida Bar, is a shareholder in the firm of Stein,
Rosenberg & Winikoff, P.A. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In addition, Mr. Winikoff served
as Staff Attorney and Senior Counsel for the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Division of Enforcement, in Washington, D.C. from 1978-1983. He practices
primarily in the area of securities litigation.
*** Ms. Bradford, a member of the Florida Bar, is an associate with the firm of Stein,
Rosenberg & Winikoff, P.A. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She practices principally in the
area of securities litigation.
1. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1991) and FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-300 to
r. 3E-900.001 (1993).
2. Ch. 92-9, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 156, 159 (reenacting and amending FLA. STAT. §
517.12(14), codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(14) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at
159 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.2015 (Supp. 1992)); id. § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws at 162
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.201 (Supp. 1992)); ch. 92-45, § I, 1992 Fla. Laws 413,
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.051 (Supp. 1992)); id. § 2 1992 Fla. Laws at 415 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 517. 061(6), (7) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 416 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 517. 111(1) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 517.12( 1I) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
517.131(3) (Supp. 1992)); id § 6, Fla. Laws at 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517. 141
(Supp. 1992)); id. § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(c), (d),
(g), (j), (m) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
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Chapter 92-9 entitled, "Banking and Finance Department-Investiga-
tions-Confidentiality of Information," amends chapter 517 to provide
exceptions to the state disclosure laws3 for certain information provided to
the Department of Banking and Finance ("Department"), and a privilege
against civil liability for persons who provide information to the Department
for the furnishing of such information.4
This relatively small amendment may have significant impact. First,
it enacts an investigative privilege from state disclosure laws similar to that
long enjoyed by federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA").5 Second, it exceeds the privilege granted federal investigative
agencies by making consumer complaints or other information relevant to
investigations by the Department, confidential even after the close of an
investigation where the disclosure of such information might reveal
identifying information of any complainant, customer or account holder.6
517.301(1)(a) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 9, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421; ch. 92-198, § I, 1992 Fla. Laws
1837 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.075 (Supp. 1992)). Incidental to the changes to chapter
517 promulgated by the Legislature, the rules of the Florida Administrative Code were
revised for the purpose of implementing the amendments of chapter 517. The following
regulations were adopted in 1993: FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-200.001, r. 3E-301.002,
r. 3E-400.003, r. 3E-600.001, r. 3E-600.002, r. 3E-600.004, r. 3E-600.005, r. 3E-600.007,
r. 3E-600.008, r. 3E-600.0012-.014, and r. 3E-600.019.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-119.16 (1991). These sections state that, generally, information
obtained by state officials must be made available to the public and contains exemptions
thereto, for various circumstances. See generally id. § 119.07.
4. Ch. 92-9, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 156, 159 (reenacting and amending FLA. STAT.
§ 517.12(14), codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(14) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws
at 159 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.2015 (Supp. 1992)).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). The new section appears to be modeled upon FOIA, but
contains some important differences as discussed infra.
6. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(I)(b)2 (Supp. 1992); cf 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988) which
only allows protection of information gathered for law enforcement purposes and only to the
extent that such information:
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or
any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and,
in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting
a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably
[Vol. 18
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This section also makes provision for non-disclosure of information relating
to department personnel and their families.7 It also makes provisions for
the continuing confidentiality of the information even if it is offered in
evidence in an administrative, civil or criminal proceeding at the discretion
of the presiding officer.8 Furthermore, the Department is permitted to share
information with any law enforcement, administrative agency, or regulatory
organization, provided such agency or organization maintains the confidenti-
ality of the information, so long as it would otherwise be confidential.9
This section also extends exemption from disclosure laws to informa-
tion made available to the Department on a "confidential or similarly
restricted basis;"' however, the subparagraph contains limiting language
specifying that the exemptions are not to be construed to prohibit disclosure
of information required by law to be filed with the Department or otherwise
subject to disclosure laws." Presumably, this is intended to be a coordi-
nate provision to the one allowing the Department to give information to
other law enforcement agencies so that it could receive confidential
information from those agencies without the necessity of making such
information subject to disclosure laws.
Undoubtedly, securities counsel will attempt to use this provision to
exempt from disclosure laws any information provided to the Department
by securities broker/dealers during the course of an investigation or
examination, which include, for example, witness statements and the like.
How much the Department will cooperate with these efforts, and how much
the protections offered by this section will be challenged, remains an open
question at this juncture. Likewise, the question of who has standing to
claim or defend the exemption offered by this section, and whether it will
be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the new section also allows the
Department to keep information confidential and exempt from disclosure under the disclosure
laws in four situations also covered by the FOIA exemptions: I) where disclosure would
jeopardize the integrity of another active investigation or examination; 2) where disclosure
would reveal the identity of a confidential source; 3) where disclosure would reveal investiga-
tive techniques or procedures; and 4) where disclosure would reveal a trade secret. FLA.
STAT. § 517.2015(l)(b)1, 3-5 (Supp. 1992). The FOIA does provide a privilege similar to
that granted in section 517.2015 of the Florida Statutes for information gathered in
examination of financial institutions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)(1988).
7. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(l)(c) (Supp. 1992).
8. Id. § 517.2015(2).
9. Id. § 517.2015(l)(d).
I0. Id. § 517.2015(I)(e).
11. Id.
1993]
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give rise to a flurry of litigation similar to that found under FOIA remains
uncertain. 2
Chapter 92-9, section 4, grants a privilege against civil liability to
persons who furnish information or evidence to the Department. 3 This
subsection may have the greatest impact in the area of securities bro-
ker/dealer employment cases. There has been a significant amount of
litigation concerning questions of defamation over statements made on Form
U-5, regarding terminations of registered persons from broker/dealers.
14
Presumably, although it was clearly not the intended purpose of the section,
brokerage firms will attempt to use the privilege against civil liability,
provided by section 517.2015(3), to defend actions for defamation brought
by terminated employees.' 5
The new section may, however, be a double edged sword in that it
provides an exemption or an exception to the privilege if the person
furnishing information to the Department, acted either in bad faith or with
malice in providing such information or evidence.' 6 This appears to be a
more difficult standard for the employer to meet than was previously
12. See, e.g., George K. Chamberlin, Use of Freedom of Information Act (5 USCS §
552) as Substitute for, or as Means of Supplementing Discovery Procedures Available to
Litigants in Federal Civil, Criminal, or Administrative Proceedings, 57 A.L.R. FED. 903
(1982). Use of Freedom of Information Act as substitute for, or as means of, supplementing
discovery procedures available to litigants in federal, civil or administrative proceedings. Id.;
see also Daniel Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of
Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuits, 55
TEX. L. REV. 587 (1977); Michael Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Administrative
Procedure Act: .The Freedom of Information Act; The Privacy Act; and the Government in
the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1977); Donald Scriven, Administrative Law-
Freedom of Information Act-Investigatory File as Exemption Remains Operative after Investi-
gation and Law Enforcement Proceedings Concluded, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1136 (1973).
13. Ch. 92-9, § 4, Fla. Laws 156, 159 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(3) (Supp.
1992)).
14. A broker/dealer is required to file Form U-4 with the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., as well as with the State of Florida, upon the hiring of a person to
be employed as a registered person, and upon the registered person's termination, a Form U-5
must be filed. Broker/dealers are also required to submit additional information to the
Department on Disclosure Reporting Pages ("DRP") concerning the background of the
registered person. This includes any complaints filed by customers, any administrative or
civil actions brought by a regulatory authority, and of course, any criminal actions brought
against the registered person. In addition, Form U-5 requires the broker/dealer to state the
basis for the termination of employment. See FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (Supp. 1992); FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-600.002, r. 3E-600.008 (1992).
15. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(3) (Supp. 1992).
16. Id.
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available at common law where a terminated employee would have to prove
both bad faith and malice, not either.' 7 Thus, while the section codifies the
common law privilege for communications required to be made by law, it
broadens the exemption to that privilege by allowing one who maintains an
action in defamation to prove either bad faith or malice to avoid the statu-
tory privilege. 8 What the effect of this provision will be in defamation
cases is, of course, an open question as is the interpretation of this section
by Florida courts. It is possible that the courts may rule that the privilege,
being part of a section relating to investigations or examinations by the
Department of Banking and Finance, extends only to information transmitted
in that context and not in the context of regular Form U-5 disclosures made
by a brokerage firm. In that case, brokerage firms would be left to rely on
common law privileges and exceptions to the laws of defamation.
It is equally conceivable that the courts would construe the disjunctive
"or" to be read conjunctively as "and" and thus, to bring in line the
exemption to the privilege with the exception currently available at common
law.' 9 This would have the effect of making a person who attempts to rely
on the exception to the privilege, prove that a brokerage firm acted not only
in bad faith, but also with malice in providing information or evidence to
the Department before the exemption to the privilege granted by this section
is overcome.2"
Finally chapter 92-9, section 3 amends Florida Statutes section 517.12
to make exempt from disclosure currency reports. 2' According to this
section, registered persons are required to file currency reports with the
Department.22
The second major piece of legislation amending chapter 517 is chapter
92-45, sections 1-9, which made far more changes to the law than chapter
17. See 19 FLA. JUR. 2D Defamation and Privacy § 112 (1980).
18. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(3) (Supp. 1992).
19. See id.
20. Cf Form U-4 contains language granting a similar privilege from employee to
employer which authorizes the employer to release information to the Department and
releases the employer from any liability whatsoever for doing so. This authorization and
release is, of course, contractual and not statutory. The provision states: "I release each
employer, former employer and each other person from any and all liability, of whatever na-
ture. by reason of furnishing any of the above information, including that information
reported on the Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U-5)
.... " Rev. Form U-4 (11/91) 2, at 8.
21. Ch. 92-9, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 158, 159 (reenacting and amending FLA. STAT. §
517.12(14), codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(14) (Supp. 1992)).
22. Id.
1993]
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92-9, but whose impact may, except in one or two areas, be less significant.
This act makes several technical and clarifying amendments,23 including
amendments to section 517.051 (relating to securities exempt from
registration under the blue sky laws) specifying that the exemptions granted
by that section are self-executing, and that the person claiming any
entitlement to the exemption bears the burden of proving such entitle-
ment.24 This amendment to the introductory paragraph of Florida Statutes
section 517.051 does nothing more than codify the existing status of the
law.2 ' This section is also amended to provide an exemption for securities
issued or guaranteed by the National Credit Union Association where
formerly, the law provided the same exemption for the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation.26 The amendment also added credit unions
to the list of institutions specifically named as exempt under that section. 7
Chapter 92-45, section 2 also amended Florida Statutes section 517.061
(relating to exempt transactions in securities) to codify existing law that the
exemptions, provided by the section are self-executing, and that the burden
of proving such exemption is on the persons claiming same.28 The chapter
make certain amendments to existing subsections (6) and (7) of Florida
Statutes section 517.061, which are designated clarifying amendments by the
preamble to the session law.29 Subsection (6) of Florida Statutes section
517.061, which previously granted an exemption for transactions involving
the distribution of securities of an issuer exclusively among its own securi-
ties, in a circumstance where no commission or other remuneration is paid
in connection with the distribution was, in fact, clarified to specify securities
holders as any person holding convertible securities, non-transferable
warrants, or warrants exercisable within not more than ninety days of issu-
ance.
30
Subsection (7) of Florida Statutes section 517.061 is amended to
include transactions with qualified institutional buyers, essentially as that
term is defined by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
23. Ch. 92-45, 1992 Fla. Laws 413 (codified at FLA STAT. §§ 517.051-517.301 (Supp.
1992)).
24. Id. § 1, Fla. Laws at 413 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.051 (Supp. 1992)).
25. See id.
26. FLA. STAT. § 517.051(5) (Supp. 1992).
27. Id. § 517.051(5)(t).
28. Ch. 92-45, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 415 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 517.061 (Supp.
1992)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.061(6) (Supp. 1992)).
[Vol. 18
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("SEC").3 It also deletes the requirement that transactions with pension
or profit sharing plans are exempt where such plans have assets not less than
$500,000 and instead refers the exemption to rules also promulgated by the
Department in accordance with SEC Rules." Potentially the most inter-
esting amendment to the section is the deletion of the word "regulated"
before the words "investment company," and the insertion thereafter of the
words "as defined by the Investment Company Act of 1940." 33 Thus, the
exemption, previously only for regulated investment companies is now
extended to any investment company, as that term is defined under the
federal law.34
Chapter 92-45, section 3 amended Florida Statutes section 517.111
(relating to revocation or denial of registration of securities) by extending
the grounds for revocation or denial of registration of securities.35
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) have been clarified by the addi-
tion of the: terms "officer" and "director."'36 Previously, the paragraphs
stated that acts by the issuer or its controlling person were grounds for
denial or revocation of registration.37 Thus, the subsection specifically
includes acts of officers and directors as a basis for denial or revocation,
even if an argument could be made that they are not control persons.38 In
3 1. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.061(7) (Supp. 1992)).
32. Id.
33. Ch. 92-45, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 415 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.061(7)
(Supp. 1992)).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) defines "investment company" to be any issuer which:
(I) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (2)
is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has
such certificate outstanding; or (3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the busi-
ness of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns
or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per
centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government
securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1988). For further discussion on companies covered by the Investment
Company Act see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 17.3 (2d ed. 1990).
35. Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (Supp.
1992)).
36. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 l(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1992)). These amendments
are primarily clarifying since officers and directors are generally defined as control persons
of the issuer.
37. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111(I)(g) (Supp. 1992)).
38. The practical effect of this amendment is questionable. It is rare that circumstances
could exist where an officer or director could sustain the argument that he or she was not a
1993]
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addition to (1)(b) and (1)(c), this chapter similarly adds the terms "officer"
and "director" to subparagraph (1)(g) (formerly (d)) as persons whose
dishonesty can lead to suspension, revocation or denial of the issuer's
registration."
Chapter 92-45 adds new subparagraphs (d), (e), (f), (h) and (j) to
subsection (1) of Florida Statutes section 517.111 which provide additional
grounds for the revocation or denial of registration of securities. °
Subparagraph (1)(d) extends the revocation, suspension or denial powers to
a case where an issuer, officer, director or control person has been found
guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with the sale of securities, or is
engaged or is about to engage in making a fictitious sale or purchase of
securities, or in any practice or sale of any security which is fraudulent or
in violation of any law.4' Subparagraph (e) extends the revocation,
suspension or denial powers to cases where the issuer, officer, director or
control person of the issuer had a final judgment entered against him in a
civil action on grounds of fraud, embezzlement, misrepresentation or
deceit.42 Subparagraph (f) extends the power to instances in which the
issuer, officers, directors, or control persons of the issuer have "demonstrat-
ed any evidence of unworthiness. 43 Subparagraph (h) extends the power
to circumstances where the security in question is the subject of an
injunction or an administrative stop order or similar order prohibiting the
offer or sale of a security.44 Subparagraph (j) extends the power to
circumstances where the issuer or any person acting on its behalf has failed
control person of an issuer. See, e.g., In re Thortec Sec. Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,330, at 92,156 (Jan. 25, 1989); Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,779, at 90,814 (Oct. 22, 1976), affd,
710 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1983); Hudson v. Capital Management Int'l, Inc., [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,222, at 95,899 (Aug. 24 1982) (all holding
officers and directors to be control persons). But cf Holloway v. Howerdd, 377 F. Supp. 754
(M.D. Tenn. 1973), afftd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litigation,
747 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that officers and directors, under the circumstanc-
es presented in these cases, were not control persons).
39. Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 l(1)(g)
(Supp. 1992)).
40. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1)(d)-Oj) (Supp. 1992)).
41. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(1)(d) (Supp. 1992)).
42. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(l)(e) (Supp. 1992)).
43. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1)(0 (Supp. 1992)).
44. Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(1)(h)
(Supp. 1992)).
[Vol. 18
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timely to complete any application for registration filed with the Depart-
ment. 4
These provisions significantly broaden the Department's ability to deny,
suspend or revoke securities registrations.46 Their scope, and no doubt,
their intended scope, is extremely broad. For example, subparagraph (d) of
subsection (1) allows the Department to revoke or suspend registration
where a determination is made that an issuer or a related party is about to
engage in any securities transaction which is fictitious or fraudulent or in
violation of any law.47 Under subsection (1)(e), the Department has the
right to suspend, revoke or cancel any registration if any officer, director or
control person of the issuer or the issuer itself has a judgment entered
against it in a civil action on grounds of fraud, embezzlement, misrepresen-
tation or deceit.48  The section is not in any way limited by time, and
presumably, the Legislature determined that rather than impose a limitation
similar to the ten year limitation of disclosure of such items on Form U-4,
it would leave it to the discretion of the Department to utilize its authority
under this section regardless of the timing of the civil determination. Sub-
paragraph (f) is by far the broadest grant of powers to the Department which
allows it to suspend, revoke or cancel the registration of any security where
the issuer or any officer, director or control person of the issuer has demon-
strated "any evidence of unworthiness."49  This section neither defines
"evidence of unworthiness," nor explains what demonstration of such
unworthiness need be made. This subparagraph has no coordinate provision
in the federal law and may well be challenged on constitutional vagueness
standards. It is clearly a reaffirmation of the qualitative review standard
found in the blue sky laws of Florida and other states, and is a coordinate
provision of new subparagraph (i), formerly subsection (e), which denies
registration or grants authority to the Department to suspend or revoke regis-
tration of securities where the offer or sale of such securities would not be
"fair, just or equitable."5
45. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(1)j) (Supp. 1992)).
46. See FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (Supp. 1992).
47. Id. § 517.11 (1)(d). This authority is akin to that granted to the SEC under Section
8(e) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(e) (1991). However, the power of the
SEC, absent a stop order proceeding to suspend or delay a registration, has been rarely used.
But cf Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. I (1936); Las Vegas Hawaiian Dev. Co. v. SEC, 466 F. Supp.
928, 932 (D. Hawaii 1979).
48, FLA. STAT. § 517.11 (1)(e) (Supp. 1992).
49. Id. § 517.111(1)(f).
50, Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla, Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1)(i)
(Supp. 1992)).
1993]
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Section 517.12(1 1) is amended to change the dates for re-registration
of branch offices.' Presumably, this administrative change will help in the
processing of paperwork. This section is also amended to require the
payment of any amounts lawfully due and owing to the Department as a
precondition of re-registration. 2  Presumably, this would require the
payment of any fines levied by the Department as a precondition of re-
registration for any dealer, associated person, investment advisor or branch
office of a broker/dealer."
Section 517.131(3), relating to persons eligible to seek recovery from
the Securities Guaranty Fund, has also been amended. 4 That section, and
the ensuing sections, provide for a fund against which persons damaged by
entities regulated by the Department can seek reimbursement up to a
statutory limit of $10,000 if that person has been unsuccessful in collecting
a judgment against the judgment debtor." Subsection (3)(b), which had
previously required the issuance of a writ of execution and a return showing
that no personal or real property of the debtor was available to be levied
upon in satisfaction of the judgment or that such property was insufficient
to satisfy the judgment, has now been deleted.56 Instead, the new law
makes such a showing to be a condition within the Department's discre-
tion.5" This amendment is an addition to the old subsection (3)(c) now
denominated (3)(b)." The new law also adds subsection (3)(e), which
allows the Department to waive compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b),
which require the person to receive a final judgment and make reasonable
inquiries to ascertain whether there are sufficient assets to satisfy it if the
regulated person against whom the claim is filed is the subject of a pro-
ceeding in which a receiver has been appointed.59 While subsection (3)(e)
grants the Department the authority to make such a waiver in the event of
the appointment of a "receiver," the next sentence makes clear that the term
receiver is meant to encompass the "court appointed trustee or examiner" as
well as a receiver.6° Therefore, upon petition by the debtor or the court
51. Id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(l 1) (Supp. 1992)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.131(3) (Supp. 1992)).
55. FLA. STAT. § 517.131 (Supp. 1992).
56. Ch. 92-45, § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.131(3)(b)
(Supp. 1992)).
57. Id.
58. FLA. STAT. § 517.131(3)(b) (Supp. 1992).
59. Id. §§ 517.131(3)(c), 517.131(3)(a), (b).
60. Id. § 517.131(3)(e).
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appointed trustee, examiner or receiver, any waiver granted by the Depart-
ment will be considered a judgment for purposes of satisfying the require-
ments of Florida Statutes sections 517.131 and 517.141." This relaxation
of the requirements is welcome and long overdue for individuals defrauded
of their funds by members of the brokerage industry.
What the government giveth, the government taketh away. The
amendments to subsection (1) of Florida Statutes section 517.141 exclude
from payment to a claimant any award for costs and attorney fees. 62 In
addition, if the Department honors a claim by a trustee or a receiver, the
claimant must assign all his rights against the debtor to the Department.63
The 1992 amendments to Florida Statutes section 517.141 (4), clarify that
a claimant is entitled to no more than ten thousand ($10,000) dollars from
the fund, regardless of how many accounts the claimant may have had with
a regulated entity or how many judgments the claimant attains against
same.64 Subsections (5), (6) and (7) of Florida Statutes section 517.141
clarify the obligation of a claimant to reimburse all amounts received in
excess of what is permitted by law, or if the judgment is overturned on
appeal or in a collateral proceeding, also authorizes the Department to
enforce compliance with this section by instituting legal actions to recover
such monies.65 Curiously, the amendments entitle the Department to obtain
interest, costs and attorney fees if the Department is the prevailing party in
an action to recover same, despite the fact that a claimant may not recover
for same, either in an action brought against him or her by the State to
recover excess funds paid, or as part of the judgment upon which the
original claim is based.66
Perhaps the most significant changes made by the 1992 amendments
are to be found in Florida Statutes sections 517.16167 and 517.301,6 the
former regarding revocation, denial or suspension of registration of a dealer,
investment advisor, associated person or branch office, and the latter
61. Id. §§ 517.131(3)(e), 517.141.
62. Ch. 92-45, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.141 (Supp.
1992)).
63. FLA. STAT. § 517.141(9) (Supp. 1992).
64. Ch. 92-45, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 413. 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.141(4)
(Supp. 1992)).
65. FLA. STAT. § 517.141(5)-(7) (Supp. 1992).
66. Ch. 92-45, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.141(5)-(7)
(Supp. 1992)).
67. Id. § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp. 1992)).
68. Id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (Supp. 1992)).
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involving fraudulent transactions, falsification or concealments of facts.69
Both sections have been amended to specifically include for the first time
the power to regulate the rendering of investment advice.7" Subparagraphs
(c), (d), (g) and (j) of subsection (1) of Florida Statutes section 517.161
have been amended to add, specifically, fraudulent conduct in connection
with rendering investment advice as well as in the sale or purchase of any
securities as a ground for revocation, suspension or denial of registration."
In addition, misrepresentations, concealing material facts or false statements
made in connection with the rendering of investment advice is similarly
made a grounds for administrative action.72 Finally, rendering investment
advice through any associated person not registered in compliance with the
provisions of chapter 517 is also made a ground for revocation, denial or
suspension of registration.73
Similarly, Florida Statutes section 517.301 has been broadened to make
unlawful, not only fraud in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any investment or security, but also in connection with the rendering of any
investment advice.74
These changes clearly reflect the national concern for the growing
number of people defrauded by individuals or entities labeling themselves
"investment advisors." The federal government has focused on strengthen-
ing federal regulation of investment advisors.75 The Florida amendments
69. Id. §§ 7-8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420-21 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 517.161-517.301
(Supp. 1992)).
70. Id. § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp. 1992)).
71. Ch. 92-45, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)
(Supp. 1992)).
72. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(d) (Supp. 1992).
73. Ch. 92-45, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp.
1992)).
74. Id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (Supp. 1992)).
75. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (1988). Addition-
ally there is currently pending before Congress a bill entitled the "Investment Adviser
Regulatory Enhancement and Disclosure Act of 1993." H.R. 578, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1992). The bill would amend the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and would provide the
SEC with additional resources for its regulatory activities, and enhance investor protection
by strengthening the duties upon investment advisors as to disclosure, suitability and
confidentiality. The bill would establish a fee structure for registered investment advisors.
Such fees generated would be used to offset the cost of an increase in the SEC's investment
advisor inspection staff, and to conduct surveys of unregistered advisors. The bill would
also: 1) increase the frequency of examinations of high-risk advisors; 2) establish a
mechanism for identification of unregistered advisors; 3) establish express suitability
standards; 4) improve disclosure of conflicts of interest and other pertinent information; 5)
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seem an aggressive and positive step in closing the loopholes concerning the
regulation of those who offer financial services to the public.76 Definitio-
nal uniformity and vigorous enforcement of the new federal and state
provisions are enthusiastically anticipated.
The change in the Florida law may present certain regulatory problems.
Previously, fraud was only actionable in the offer, purchase or sale of
securities.7 7 That is, an offer, or the purchasing or selling of securities,
was required before at unlawful act could be deemed to have occurred. By
making unlawful the fraudulent rendering of investment advice absent the
offer, purchase or sale of securities, an argument could be raised that the
unlawful act is totally inchoate until acted upon by the potential victim. In
response, no doubt, the Department and plaintiffs counsel will argue that
the rendering of fraudulent investment advice is akin to the offer of a
security, the alleged perpetrator having committed all the acts necessary for
a violation of the law. In private actions, presumably, absent a showing of
detrimental reliance, damages, if available, would be nominal. The
Department on the other hand, would presumably not need a showing of
damages to institute injunctive proceedings against an investment advisor for
rendering fraudulent investment advice."
Moreover, the 1992 amendments add new subparagraph (m) to Florida
Statutes section 517.161(1) which enables the Department to suspend,
revoke, restrict or deny the registration of any investment advisor or other
regulated person having been civilly adjudicated to have committed fraud
in connection with the rendering of investment advice or any violation of
federal or state securities or commodities laws or any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder or any injunction or adverse administrative order by
require fidelity bonds of certain advisors; 6) provide for the establishment of a toll-free tele-
phone listing to receive inquiries regarding disciplinary history of investment advisors; and
7) provide for confidentiality of client financial information. Id.
The proposed legislation would require investment advisors, under certain circum-
stances, to pay, upon registration, and annually thereafter, a fee based on assets under
management. One of the most important provisions of this proposed legislation is that it
would add to the Investment Advisor's Act a section specifically prohibiting advisors from
making unsuitable recommendations and require that the advisor make a reasonable inquiry
into the client's financial circumstances.
76. See Ch. 92-45, §§ 7-8, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420-21 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 517.161-517.301 (Supp. 1992)).
77. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1988) (amended 1992).
78. Id. § 517.19 1. The Department is granted the right to seek injunctive relief for any
violation of chapter 517. Id. This section makes clear that no damage need already to have
occurred, granting the Department authority to seek injunction against one who "is about to
engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter." Id.
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a state or federal agency regulating banking, insurance, finance or small loan
companies, real estate, mortgage brokerage or other related or similar
industries.79 The subparagraph does limit the right and power of the
Department to bring such a proceeding if the registered entity has been
continuously registered with the Department for five years after the entry of
the decision, provided of course, that the decision has been timely reported
to the Department pursuant to its rules. 80 Presumably, the threat of a
coattail action by the Department to revoke or suspend the registration of a
regulated entity because of the entry of a civil or regulatory judgment of
fraud will encourage additional lawsuits against regulated persons as well as
settlements prior to determination of those actions. More liberal settlement
policies on the part of regulated entities can be expected to generate even
further litigation.
The language of subsection (1)(m) of Florida Statutes section 517.161
is exceedingly broad. This is no doubt intentional. It allows the Depart-
ment to deny, revoke or suspend registration when any regulated person
"[h]as been the subject of any decision, finding, injunction, suspension,
prohibition, revocation, denial, judgment, or administrative order by any
court of competent jurisdiction, administrative law judge, or by any state or
federal agency, national securities, commodities, or option exchange, or
national securities, commodities, or option association . ". ..,, It is an
open question whether this includes a decision by an arbitrator or arbitration
panel of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., or arguably, even of the American Arbitration
Association. While the language, though broad, does not include the terms
arbitrators or arbitration panel, it is conceivable that the Department could
deem an arbitrator's decision to be a "decision" or "finding" of a national
securities, commodities, or option exchange or national securities or option
association.82 Further credence to this argument is lent by the fact that the
subparagraph refers to reported or reportable determinations, 3 and arbitra-
tion decisions have been deemed to be such according to the rules goveming
reports on Forms U-4 and U-5. 4 If this was in fact the intention of the
legislature, arbitral decisions should be one of the specified grounds for
79. Ch. 92-45, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp.
1992)).
80. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(m) (Supp. 1992).
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Rev. Form U-4 (11/91) and Rev. Form U-5 (11/91).
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revocation or suspension spelled out in the statute and further legislation is
needed for its inclusion. In the absence of such legislation and the
otherwise expansive of reach of subparagraph (m), a compelling argument
can be made that it was not the intent of the legislature to include such
decisions. The final legislative amendment to chapter 517, made in the
1992-1993 legislative sessions, was added by chapter 92-198."5 This
amendment added Florida Statutes section 517.075 to the securities laws
requiring disclosure in any prospectus for the issuance of securities in this
state, if the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer does business with the
government of Cuba or with any person o affiliate located in Cuba. 6 The
section further provides that after a registration is in effect, if a company
later engages in business with the government or any person or affiliate
located in Cuba, the issuer must file with the Department a statement to that
effect within 90 days.87 Additionally, the section provides penalties for
non-compliance, including a civil remedy to any purchaser of securities sold
in violation of the section. 88 This section also provides for public disclo-
sure, upon request, of any statements or forms filed with the Department by
an issuer doing business with the government of Cuba or its citizens or
affiliates. 9 The authors believe this provision to be unique to the laws of
the State of Florida.
In addition to the enacted legislation, five bills affecting or seeking to
regulate or amend the securities laws were introduced in the last two
legislative sessions. Senate Bill 105890 and its coordinate House Bill
02419' sought to reduce statutory interest rates from twelve to nine percent
in the absence of a written contract.92 The bills died in the Senate and
House. 93 House bill 1893 also introduced in the 1993 session, had as its
primary purpose to clarify the provisions related to selling and registering
85. Ch. 92-198, § 1, 1992 Fla. Laws 1837 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.075 (Supp.
1992)).
86. FLA. STAT. § 517.075 (Supp. 1992).
87. Id. § 517.075(3).
88. Id. § 517.075(6).
89. id. § 517.075(2)(c).
90. S. 1058, FLA. S. JOUR 117 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Senate Commerce Committee
3/24/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 109, S. 1058.
91. H. 0241, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 18 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Committee on Judiciary
4/04/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 26, H. 0241.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 90-91.
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small corporate securities offerings and to simplify registration for such
offerings, i.e. offerings under one million dollars.94 This bill also died in
committee. 95 Senate Bill 354 would have provided a rate of interest for
certain judgments equal to the prime rate plus two percent and would also
have provided for the imposition of prejudgment interest.96 It too died in
committee.97 Finally, Senate Bill 1252 sought to incorporate some of the
amendments of the prior unsuccessful bills and would have included a
prohibition on the sale of securities into, from or within the state without
registration.9" It also would have deleted an exception to the definition of
"associated person" for the registration of small corporate offerings and
would have authorized the Department to adopt rules to facilitate these
registrations.99 This bill also died in committee'0° and no securities
legislation was enacted in the 1993 session.'
In 1992, the Legislature amended one section of the Florida Statutes,
which though not specifically relating to securities regulation, may have a
significant impact in the area. 0 2  Chapter 768.73, regarding punitive
damages, previously provided that sixty percent of all judgments awarding
punitive damages in the areas of "negligence, strict liability, products
liability, misconduct in commercial transactions, professional liability or
breach of warranty that involves willful, wanton or gross misconduct"'0 3
94. H. 1893, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 160 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Committee on Commerce
4/4/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 210, H. 1893.
95. See supra note 94.
96. S. 354, FLA. S. JOUR 73 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Committee on Commerce
4/4/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 40, S. 354.
97. See supra note 96.
98. S. 1252, FLA. S. JOUR. 134 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Messages 4/4/93); see FLA.
LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF SENATE BILLS at 129, S. 1252.
99. See supra note 98.
100. See supra note 98.
101. During 1992-93, the SEC enacted several new rules and regulations affecting, inter
alia, proxy solicitations, small business capital formation and reporting requirements, and,
most notably, penny stock regulation. The details of these initiatives are beyond the scope
of this paper, but should be of interest to Florida Securities practioners, the SEC's activities
are the subject of a well written article entitled "Significant 1992 Regulatory Developments,"
48/3 The Business Lawyer 977 (May 1993).
102. Ch. 92-85, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 821 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp.
1992)).
103. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (1988).
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was payable either to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund in the case
of personal injury or wrongful death, °4 or to the General Revenue Fund
in the case of other punitive damages awards."0 5 Chapter 92-85, effective
April 8, 1992, reduced the percentage of punitive damages awards payable
to the state from sixty to thirty-five percent. 0 6 Thus, a successful plaintiff
in an action covered by Florida Statutes section 758.73 will now recover
sixty-five percent rather than forty percent of any punitive damage
award. " 7  The provision of subsection ](a) of Florida Statutes section
768.73relating to "misconduct in commercial transactions" certainly appears
broad enough to cover securities cases.' Moreover, since securities
related causes of action are often founded in fraud, which has traditionally
been a subject of punitive damage awards, it appears likely that courts
confronting the issue will apply Florida Statutes section 768.73 to securities
cases. '9 Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified
to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether Florida Statutes
section 768.73 applied to arbitration awards in a securities case.'" This
issue was previously raised in the case of Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc.,"
where the court refused to apply section 768.73 to an award of punitive
damages made by an arbitration panel because the cause of action arose
prior to the then operative date of the statute even though the award was
made after that date." 2 Section 4 of chapter 92-85 amends Florida Statute
section 763.73 to clarify that subsections (2) and (3) of Florida Statutes
section 768.73 shall apply to pending cases and causes of action in which
a judgment has not yet been entered," 3 in effect putting to rest the issue
104. Id. § 768.73(2)(b).
105. Id.
106. Ch. 92-85, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 821 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp.
1992)).
107. FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
108. See id. § 768.73(I)(a). But see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
109. But cf Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 599 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the intentional tort of malicious
prosecution was not intended to be included among those civil actions for which punitive
damages are limited by section 768.73(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Id.; see also infra notes
378-386 and accompanying text for a discussion of Florida's economic loss rule limiting
securities actions to breach of contract causes. Presumably, this would also limit the
application of puntive damages in securities cases.
110. Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 986 F.2d 459 (11 th Cir. 1993).
III. 677 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987)
112. Id. at 1139.
113. Ch. 92-85, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 821, 822 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp.
1992)).
1993]
17
Winikoff and Bradford: Blue Sky Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
raised in Peabody.
II. LITIGATION
A review of securities litigation requires inquiry on both the state and
federal level since regulation of securities is concurrent." 4  Moreover,
since the United States Supreme Court decisions in Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd,"5 and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
1 16
endorsing arbitration as a means for resolution of disputes between
broker/dealers and their customers and employees, the great majority of
these disputes have been brought either in the first instance or ultimately in
arbitration." 7  Finally, a substantial portion of the judicially created law
regarding securities regulation in Florida is made on the circuit court level
which is reported, unfortunately, sporadically, if at all. Any review
therefore, of securities litigation in Florida, cannot purport to be complete
and the practitioner is cautioned to recognize the externally imposed
limitations of any such undertaking." 8
114. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(zzz) (1988); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(kk) (1988); FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011-517.32
(1991).
115. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
116. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
117. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., reports that the Fort
Lauderdale office handled 657 cases in 1992 and another 701 have been filed to date in 1993.
Additionally, cases are arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association, the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., and other arbitral fora in Florida.
Arbitrators are not required by arbitration rules to write opinions but merely state the
ultimate resolution of the arbitration matter. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURI-
TIES DEALERS, INC. ("NASD") CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 41 (1992). These
decisions are not widely reported, and as stated, only infrequently contain any rationale.
Section 41(f of the NASD Code has been amended to make arbitration awards, their
contents, and the names of the arbitrators publicly available. "The NASD will implement this
rule change October 1, 1993. For public customer cases, the rule change will apply to
awards rendered on or after May 10, 1989. For industry cases, including employment
disputes, the rule change will apply to awards rendered on or after October 1, 1993." Self-
Regulatory Organization; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Public Availability of Arbitration Awards, SEC Release
No. 34-32740 (August 12, 1993). Any interested practitioner should also consult the
Securities Arbitration Commentator, an invaluable source ofinformation concerning securities
arbitration. The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") makes all of its awards publicly
available, and the AAA is reportedly considering doing the same in securities cases.
118. This paper also is intended as a survey only and not as an in depth analysis or
discussion of each and every decision reported in the field during the period.
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A review of federal and state court cases for the period 1992-1993" 9
reveals that the court decisions have been concentrated primarily in
arbitration related cases. Most of these cases can be loosely divided into
two areas relating to arbitration disputes: The first, involves the extent of
judicial intervention in determining under what circumstances and in what
manner aggrieved parties must submit their disputes to arbitration. These
cases generally arise on motions or petitions either to compel or stay
arbitration. The second, involves the extent, manner and grounds for
judicial review of arbitration decisions.
On the federal level, judicial inquiry into compelling or staying
arbitration has been delimited by the mandates of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA").' 20  Under the FAA, the court's authority is confined to
determining whether there is an agreement to arbitrate. 12 1 If the parties
have validly agreed to arbitrate their dispute, under the FAA, the district
court must compel arbitration.
1 22
The federal courts have made clear, however, that while the scope of
their inquiry may be limited, they must and will inquire into the issue of the
making of an agreement to arbitrate where the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate is in issue. In such circumstances, a district court will decide if the
arbitration agreement is enforceable against the parties and will not allow
the question to be addressed by the arbitrators. 23 In Chastain v. Robin-
son-Humphrey,124 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a denial of a motion to
compel arbitration where the customer denied signing the arbitration
agreement.125 Stating the general rule that a mere denial without more is
119. The authors have attempted to review the decisions published between January 1,
1992 and August 31, 1993.
120. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
121. Id. § 4. This section further provides that the court make this determination in a
summary proceeding. Id.
122. Id. §§ 2, 3. Section two of the FAA mandates that a written agreement to arbitrate
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .... " Id. § 2, and section three of the FAA
requires courts to stay trial of any action in which it finds any issue contained therein to be
referable to arbitration pursuant to an agreement of the parties. Id. § 3. See, e.g., Chastain
v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 851 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
123. See Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854; see also Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). In Volt, the Supreme Court
instructed: "Iwle have recognized that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when
they have not agreed to do so ... nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from
excluding certain claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement . Id. at 478
(citations omitted).
124. 957 F.2d at 851.
125. Id. at 854.
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normally insufficient to deny compelling arbitration,'26 the Chastain court
nevertheless affirmed the lower court ruling.'27 The court recognized that
in the rare instance, where, as here, a customer makes a substantial showing
that she had not, in fact, signed the arbitration agreement, the court, not the
arbitrators, must determine the validity of the agreement. 2 The Chastain
court expressed the general rule as follows: "the first task of a court asked
to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that dispute.' 2 9
In Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc. v. Lifshutz, 3 ° the Fourth District
Court of Appeal construed the state court's duty under the Florida Arbitra-
tion Code ("FAC")'3' to be identical, that is, the court must make the
determination whether an enforceable written agreement to arbitrate exists
between the parties. 32 Unlike its federal counterpart, however, the state
court construed the burden to be on the party seeking arbitration to establish
the existence of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.'33 Finding that
despite submitting the arbitration agreements, appellant Shearson Lehman
had failed to produce handwriting experts or make any other attempt to
authenticate the signature on the brokerage agreement.'34 The appellate
court affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion to compel, holding that
"[t]he record does not show any evidence that the appellees signed or
126. See id
127. Id. at 855.
128. Id. at 854.
129. Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854 (citation omitted). Where, however, it is undisputed that
the party seeking to avoid arbitration has not signed any contract requiring same, as the court
stated, "the calculus changes." Id. "Under these circumstances, there is no presumptively
valid general contract which would trigger the district court's duty to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Act." Id. "Therefore, before sending any such grievances to arbitration, the
district court itse/f must first decide whether or not the non-signing party can nonetheless be
bound by the contractual language." Id.; see also Cancanon v. Smith Barney Upham & Co.,
805 F.2d 998, 1000 (11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Stating that in such circumstances "[t]o
make a genuine issue entitling the [party seeking to avoid arbitration] to a trial by jury [on
the arbitrability question], an unequivocal denial that the agreement has been made [is]
needed, and some evidence should [be] produced to substantiate the denial." Chastain, 957
F.2d at 854. In the instant matter, the court agreed that appellant Chastain had, in fact, made
such showing and was therefore entitled to a trial on the issue of the validity of the arbi-
tration agreement. Id.
130. 595 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
131. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-682.22 (1991).
132. Lifshutz, 595 So. 2d at 997.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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assented to the brokerage agreement submitted by the appellants.' ' 5
One year later, in Wheat, First Securities, Inc. v. Green,'36 the
Eleventh Circuit reiterated the proposition that it is the task of the court
asked to compel arbitration to determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate that dispute.'37 In Wheat, while recognizing that Congress in
enacting the Federal Arbitration Act declared a national policy favoring
arbitration, 3 1 the court reiterated its position in Chastain stating that
"[s]imply put, parties cannot be forced to submit to arbitration if they have
not agreed to do so. '
The Wheat court was asked to review a judgment of the district court
that a securities broker/dealer had no obligation to arbitrate claims by
investors arising from transactions with the broker/dealer's predecessor in
interest. 40  Appellants, customers of another brokerage firm, signed
arbitration agreements with that broker.'4 ' Thereafter, Wheat purchased
the assets of the original broker, and in its agreement expressly denied
assuming any liabilities of its predecessor.'42 Notwithstanding, appellants,
whose accounts were transferred to Wheat after the asset purchase, sought
to hold Wheat liable on the questioned transactions conducted by the
predecessor. "' The Eleventh Circuit, echoing its prior ruling in Chastain,
held that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate the matters before it.'44
In affirming the lower court's determination that Wheat was not bound
by the arbitration agreement of its predecessor, the Eleventh Circuit also
stated that since contract interpretation is generally a question of law,
135. Id. In his dissent, Judge Anstead noted that appellants had in fact successfully
introduced the arbitration agreements into evidence and that since no other evidence to the
contrary existed in the record, a motion to compel arbitration should have been granted. Id.
at 998. Presumably, Judge Anstead was recognizing that the burden of disputing the making
of the arbitration agreement shifted to the appellee after the agreement itself was submitted
in evidence. It is arguable that the dissent's position in Lifshutz is closer to that espoused by
the Eleventh Circuit in Chastain, since the Chastain court, at least impliedly recognized that
the party seeking to compel arbitration is required to make a prima facie showing of the
existence of an arbitration agreement, the burden then shifts to the party challenging that
agreement to present evidence rebutting same. See Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854.
136. 993 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 817.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854).
140. Id. at 815.
141. Wheat, 993 F.2d at 816.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 818.
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"'[d]eterminations of arbitrability, like the interpretation of any contractual
provision, are subject to de novo review."' 145  Thus, while the de novo
review standard announced in Wheat was applied therein to facts that were
not in dispute,146 the court's previous review in Chastain involved a case
where the facts were very much in question: whether or not appellant
Chastain was bound by an arbitration agreement, despite her vehement
assertion that she had never signed same.'47 In Chastain, however, the
Eleventh Circuit was careful to note that "the district court did not decide
that Chastain could not in fact be bound by the arbitration clauses of the
customer agreements. The district court only determined that Chastain's
duty to arbitrate would be decided by the district court, rather than being
decided by an arbitration panel."' 48  The court carefully noted that this
was the only determination that it reviewed upon appeal.'49 Left open by
its two rulings, Chastain and Wheat, is the question of what standard the
court would apply to any subsequent determination of the district court in
Chastain. In other words, whether the appellate court would review the
district court's determination on the issue of arbitrability de novo, or under
the more common abuse of discretion standard normally applied in cases
where a district court makes factual determinations.5
The Eleventh Circuit may have indicated its view on this question
earlier in the year in its decision in Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.'51 In Kelly, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging two causes
of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.152
After two years, the plaintiffs dismissed one of their claims and the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the remaining
claim.' 53 Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced arbitration of four state
common law claims alleging essentially the same conduct as the earlier
litigation, based on a clause in the arbitration agreement which required
arbitration of all claims with the exception of federal securities laws
claims.' 54 On motion of the defendant, the district court enjoined the
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. Wheat, 993 F.2d at 815.
147. Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854.
148. Id. at 853.
149. Id.
150. PHILIP J. PADAVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE § 5.5 (1988).
151. 985 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 1068; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983).
153. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1068.
154. Id.
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arbitration proceeding and Kelly appealed.' 55 In affirming the lower
court's order, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[w]e review the district court's
injunction for abuse of discretion."' 56  Thus, it appears that despite its
enunciation in Wheat of the de novo review standard in questions of
arbitrability, whereas in Kelly, the district court has been required to review
evidence in making its determination on whether or not to compel arbitra-
tion, the court will apply an abuse of discretion standard not de novo review
of the lower court's determination. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in
Kelly, "the district court . . . [is] in the best position to decide whether.
* an injunction was necessary. '
In Kelly, appellants sought to enjoin the subsequent arbitration
proceeding on grounds of resjudicata."5 ' In upholding the district court's
power to grant an injunction to protect its own rulings,'59 the court reject-
ed an argument that the issue of resjudicata should be left to the arbitrators
"because it is an affirmative defense that goes to the merits of . . . [the]
claims."' 6 ° The court stated "[w]e think the better rule is that courts can
decide res judicata."''
The Eleventh Circuit's willingness to have courts, rather than the
arbitrators, consider the issue of resjudicata is interesting in that it appears
to be contrary to and a departure from the general rule that courts faced
with a request to compel arbitration will limit their review to the issue of the
making of the agreement to arbitrate and the failure or refusal of one of the
parties to agree to arbitration.'62 The Kelly court's departure from the
general rule resurrects questions that had previously been thought, at least
on the federal level, to have been settled. By deciding the resjudicata
issue, the court clearly did not limit the scope of its inquiry to the valid
making of an agreement to arbitrate. Whether and under what circumstanc-
es federal courts will expand their scope of inquiry when asked to compel
or stay arbitration are again open questions. As we shall see, on the state
level, the question of the scope of judicial review of motions to compel or
stay arbitration is not at all well settled and is, in fact, the subject of a rather
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1070.
157. Id.
158. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Chastain, 957 F.2d at 817; see also Wheat, 993 F.2d at 817.
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furious debate.' 63
During the period 1992-93, the Eleventh Circuit, following the dictates
of the United States Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,'6 4 joined the Fifth, 65 Sixth, 66 and Ninth 67 Circuits in deter-
mining that claims of sex discrimination under Title VII, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,161 were subject to arbitration. In
Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court held that a former stockbroker,
dismissed from his employment, who sought recovery under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,169 was required, by having
signed a U-4 registration form which provided for arbitration of all disputes
between him and his employer, to arbitrate his age discrimination
claims.170  The Supreme Court rejected the employee's contentions that
Congress had intended to exclude age discrimination claims from the
purview of the FAA' In Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,'72 the
plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleging sexual harassment and
seeking relief under Title VII and pendent state law claims.7 3  The
defendants sought a stay of the Title VII claims pending arbitration under
the FAA. 174  The Eleventh Circuit, noting that in her application for
registration as a stockbroker plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate all her disputes
with her employer, compelled arbitration of all claims including the Title
VII claims. 1
75
The expansion of the scope of causes of action which have been held
to be arbitrable in cases like Bender undoubtedly come as a result of what
the courts see as a clear mandate from the Supreme Court: They are to
effectuate the intention of parties signing arbitration agreements and order
163. See infra notes 211-46 and accompanying text.
164. III S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
165. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), appeal after
remand, 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992). Originally, the Fifth Circuit had determined Title
VII cases were not subject to arbitration, but its decision was vacated by the United States
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Gilmer. Id.;
see also Gilmer, I I I S. Ct. at 1647.
166. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
167. Mago v. Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1989).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1990).
170. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
171. Id. at 1657.
172. 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 699.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 700.
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all claims not specifically required to be determined by a court to arbitra-
tion. '76 Perhaps the attitude was best described by the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Pierce v. J W. Charles-Bush Securities, Inc.'77  The Pierce
court in determining that parties could agree to grant arbitrators authority to
award attorneys' fees, reviewed the various decisions of the United States
Supreme Court expanding the scope of arbitration in Moses H. Cone,1
78
Southland Corp. v. Keating,179 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,8' Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 8' and
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 82. The Pierce court then stated:
"[i]f civil rights, antitrust and securities fraud claims are not inappropriate
for arbitration, it is very difficult to imagine a civil claim in which an
agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced."'83  In general, this is
probably a fair statement of the law."S4
Perhaps the most highly debated issue regarding judicial intervention
to compel or stay arbitrations before Florida courts during 1992-1993,
involves what has come to be known as the "AMEX Window." 185 The
matter was ultimately resolved, at least in part, by the Eleventh Circuit's
recent opinion in Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co.' 6 The
176. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983) (the FAA is a "congressional declaration of the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration ... [requiring that] as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues, should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
177. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
178. 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
179. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act prohibited the states
from requiring a judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties had
agreed to resolve by arbitration).
180. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that certain antitrust and RICO claims were
arbitrable).
181. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (reversing the Court's previous holding that securities fraud
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could be determined in arbitration).
182. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding civil rights claims under the Age Discrimination
and Employment Act arbitrable).
183. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 628.
184. But cf Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614. The Mitsubishi court specifically limited its
holding to international antitrust cases. Id. at 629; cf Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1988) (upholding a state court determination
to stay arbitration while proceeding with a related trial).
185. See, e.g., Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 999 F.2d 509 (11 th Cir.
1993). In essence, the AMEX Window cases do not involve the courts in making a
determination of whether or not parties agreed to arbitrate, but rather whether specific fora
for those arbitrations are permitted or specified in the contracts. Id.
186. Id.
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controversy surrounding the AMEX Window involves whether or not an
involved customer of a broker/dealer may seek resolution of disputes by
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). In
Luckie, the Eleventh Circuit decided that, where there was a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties which contained a provision denominating
fora for arbitration (a "forum selection provision") which did not include
AAA, the answer was no.'87 In Luckie, the plaintiffs, who were customers
of the broker/dealer and its registered representatives, alleged that the
defendant mismanaged and misused their investment accounts."' In April
1989, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the AAA to resolve the dis-
pute.' 89 The case was filed pursuant to article VIII, sections 1 and 2(c)
of the AMEX Constitution which allow a customer of any member organiza-
tion to demand arbitration before the AAA.'90  Thereafter, plaintiffs
commenced suit in the Sixth Circuit Court of Florida seeking a declaratory
judgment, affirming AAA jurisdiction and compelling arbitration before the
AAA.'9' The case was subsequently removed to the federal district court
on diversity jurisdiction. 92 The day before removal, however, the defen-
dant filed suit in New York City attacking the jurisdiction of the AAA and
seeking to compel arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange,
("NYSE"), National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD"), or
AMEX.' 93 The New York court then enjoined the plaintiffs from proceed-
187. Id. at 514. ("[T]he New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE"), the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. ("AMEX"), and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") are all self-regulatory organizations, overseen and regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The AAA is an independent arbitral forum.") Id. at 511.
188. Luckie, 999 F.2d at 510.
189. Id.
190. Id. Section 1 of article VIII of the AMEX Constitution provides that members of
the exchange "shall arbitrate all controversies arising in connection with their business...
between them and their customers as required by any customer's agreement or, in the absence
of a written agreement, if the customer chooses to arbitrate." Id. Section 2(c), the so-called
"AMEX Window" provision, states that "[airbitration shall be conducted under the arbitration
procedures of this Exchange, except as follows: . . . (c) if any of the parties to the
controversy is a customer, the customer may elect to arbitrate before the American
Arbitration Association in the City of New York, unless the customer has expressly agreed,
in writing, to submit only to the arbitration procedure of the Exchange." Id.
191. Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1116, 1117
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
192. Id.
193. Id. The defendants actions were based upon a "choice of law" provision of the
arbitration agreement which specified that New York law was to apply to any disputes
between the parties.
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ing in any manner with their claim before the AAA and the plaintiffs filed
a motion challenging the jurisdiction of that court to hear the case. 194 The
federal district court in Florida then stayed further action in the Florida
matter pending the New York court's resolution of the jurisdictional is-
sue.' 95 The New York court then issued an internal order affirming its
jurisdiction to which plaintiffs filed objection on September 18, 1989.96
The Florida federal court continued its stay pending a final decision of the
jurisdictional question in New York until that court had failed to act for
almost two years.' 97  In June 1991, the district court lifted its stay.'98
The court then ruled on the plaintiffs motion to compel arbitration and
determined that the customer's agreement in the instant case, which
provided in relevant part for "arbitration in accordance with the rules,
regulations and procedures then in effect of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., the AMEX or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc...
,"'99 barred arbitration before the AAA.2"' The district court, adopting
the defendant's position that the AMEX window operates only as a default
provision in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties, refused
to compel AAA arbitration.2"' The case made its tortuous way to the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Luckie, 766 F. Supp. at 1117.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1119.
200. Id. at 1120.
201. Luckie, 766 F. Supp. at 1120. Ultimately, the New York court decided to rule on
the matter before it. In Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Charles Luckie, Index
No.: 9909/89 (Supreme Court, New York October 14, 1992), the New York court, noting
the actions of the Middle District of Florida, finally determined the only issue remaining be-
fore it, Smith Barney's motion to dismiss one of the plaintiff's claims as time-barred under
the Supreme Court decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrew v. Gilbertson, 11 I
S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (adopting the one/three year statute of limitations applicable to other
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to actions under section 10(b) thereof). The
New York court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the claims as time-barred on the
grounds that the claim was not time-barred under New York or federal statutes of limitation.
Id. at 5. The court based its reasoning on the fact that Congress had amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by enacting Section 27A "to modify the retroactive effect of the
Lampf ruling." Id. at 4. "Section 27A provides for re-instatement of certain actions time-
barred and dismissed under Lanmpf if timely commenced prior to June 19, 1991, [date of the
Lampfdecision], under applicable federal or state limitations as herein." Id. Accordingly,
the court found that respondent's claim was not time-barred under the New York (CPLR
213 [91) or federal law. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.2"' On August 26, 1993, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding closing the AMEX Window in
cases where the contract between the parties specifically designates other
fora for arbitration.2 3  Relying on Second Circuit decisions in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis,2 4 and PaineWebber,
Inc. v. Rutherford,0 5 as well as the Sixth Circuit decision in Roney & Co.
v. Goren,0b the court held that a forum selection provision of a customer
arbitration agreement can supersede the arbitration provisions of the AMEX
Constitution, namely the AMEX Window.20 7
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement in Luckie, the District
Court for the Middle District of Florida was again required to consider the
viability of the AMEX Window. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. King,"'8 Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich was confronted with an
arbitration agreement containing a forum selection clause providing for
specific fora which, while specifically including the AMEX, did not provide
for arbitration before the AAA.2"9 Relying on her previous ruling in
Luckie, the Judge preliminarily enjoined an AAA arbitration based on the
fact that the AMEX Window was superseded or closed by the specific
provisions in the arbitration agreement. °
On the state level, a rather heated debate is raging about the proper
scope of inquiry for a court when faced with a motion to compel or stay
arbitration. In 1989, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Anstis Ornstein
202. Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 999 F.2d 509 (11 th Cir. 1993).
203. Id. at 514.
204. 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990).
205. 903 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1990).
206. 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989).
207. Luckie, 999 F.2d at 514.
208. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. King, 804 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Fla.
1992).
209. Id. at 1513.
210. Id. at 1514, 1516. Some months earlier, in Orlowe v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1991-1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,952, at 94,057 (Fla. 10th
Cir. Ct. 1991), a state court, also finding that the specific forum selection provision of an
arbitration agreement did not include AAA, held that the AMEX Window was closed and the
AMEX constitutional provision was superseded by the specific arbitration agreement. But
see Ray v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Case No. 92-845-CAOI (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. 1992)
where a court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings and directed the parties to
proceed immediately with the arbitration then pending before the AAA pursuant to the
AMEX Window. The court specifically referred site selection and all other issues to the
arbitrators for resolution. Id.
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Associates v. Palm Beach County,21 1 a non-securities case, held that issues
of statutes of limitation when raised as objections to submitting matters to
arbitration, are to be determined by the courts and not by arbitrators.
2
,
2
Two years later, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, relying on its previous
holding in Anstis Ornstein, refused to allow an arbitration panel to determine
whether or not a claim under the Florida probate code was time-barred. 13
The court, in a rather pugnacious opinion in Estate of Vernon v. Shearson,
Lehman Bros., Inc.,2 ' stated:
We hold that just because parties agree to the arbitration of disputes in
the execution of a contract, this does not mean that statutes of limitation
are without effect. It certainly does not mean that the arbitrators should
interpret the applicable statute of limitation to decide whether it applies
or not.2 s
In 1992, in a per curiam decision in Lange v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.,216 the Fourth District Court of Appeal again refused to allow arbitra-
tors to consider the issue of statutes of limitation, relying on its opinions in
Anstis Ornstein and Vernon.1 7
In Anstis Ornstein, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was not
required to consider the applicability and effect of the FAA because it was
a non-securities case. Nor was it required to consider that most federal
courts, in construing their role under the FAA, have usually refused to
determine issues of statutes of limitation, and referred such issues to arbitra-
tion. '
211. 554 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
212. Id. at 19.
213. Id.
214. 587 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
215. Id. at 1170.
216. 601 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir.
1991); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Titan Group, Inc. v. Anne
Arundel County, 588 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1984), afd, 749 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1984). The
Eleventh Circuit has adopted the rationale of the Second Circuit's Wagoner opinion. See
Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (1lth Cir. 1982).
Generally, the rationale is that statutes of limitation are affirmative defenses and do not go
to the issue of whether or not the parties agreed to arbitrate. See generally Wagoner, 944
F.2d at 121 (where the rule is that "it is up to the arbitrators, not the court, to decide the
validity of time-bar defenses."). But cf Lawler v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Case No.:
91-136-CIV-FTM-17D (M.D. Fla. 1992):
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In Vernon (and presumably Lange), however, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal directly confronted the dictates of the FAA, as well as the
decisions of the federal courts construing same. Not only did the Vernon
court find exception to the general application of the FAA in cases of
statutes of limitation arising under state probate law, its strong dicta
indicated a disinclination to apply the majority approach to statutes of
limitation issues in general.2" 9 The Vernon court, referring to its opinion
in Anstis Ornstein, stated: "this court [has previously] held that it is the
court's responsibility, and not that of the arbitrators, to decide whether
arbitration has been time barred by statute."22  The court's 1992 per
curiam decision in Lange, derived from a circuit court injunction of an AAA
arbitration concerning "standard" securities law claims of fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence and breach of contract. 2 In Lange, the Fourth
District affirmed the circuit court ruling without deeming the subject worthy
of comment.222
The position of the Fourth District has, however, by September 1993,
become a rather solitary one. The Fifth District in Victor v. Dean Witter
In an action to compel arbitration under [sic] Federal Arbitration Act, [a court]
generally considers no issues other than the making of the agreement to arbitrate
and the failure or refusal of the other party to arbitrate, and apart from equity
doctrines such as laches, which on a motion to compel arbitration the court
sitting as a court of equity must take into account, all other issues of law and
fact are for determination by the arbitrators.
Opinion at 3 (emphasis added) (citing In re Ropner Shipping Co., 118 F. Supp 919
(D.C.N.Y. 1954). In Lawler, in an arbitration that was heard before the American Arbitration
Association, the AAA was advised that one of the respondents filed a petition in bankruptcy
two years earlier. In light of the bankruptcy proceedings, the AAA sua sponte temporarily
suspended the arbitration. Id. at 2. Lawler thereafter filed a petition with the court seeking
an order overruling the decision of the AAA. Id. The court deemed itself bound by the
general rule that it could inquire only into issues of the making of the agreement to arbitrate
and the failure of one party to arbitrate. The court, therefore, refused to reverse the arbitr-
ators' decision, and found that "[rleversal of the arbitrators' decision would be contrary to
our national policy favoring arbitration and would undermine the authority of the arbitrators
to make procedural decisions." Id. at 3.
219. Vernon, 587 So. 2d at 1170.
220. Id.
221. Lange v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1347, 1347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); see also Lange v. Dean Witter Reynold's, Inc., No. 91-0770-CA-03 (Fla. 19th
Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1992) (order granting temporary injunction).
222. Lange, 601 So. 2d at 1347. But cf Paine Webber, Inc. v. Hall, [Current] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,697, at 97,237 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 1993), discussed infra.
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Reynolds, .nc.,223 considered and expressly rejected the Fourth District's
approach to the extent that it extended past the probate code.224 In the
securities context, the Victor court refused to follow Vernon, noting that
cases construing the court's powers of review under the FAA require it to
leave issues of statutes of limitation to the arbitrators.2 5 The Victor court
also rejected an argument based on Volt, 2 26 that since the arbitration
agreement contained a choice of law provision specifying the application of
New York law, the FAA was inapplicable.227 The Victor court reasoned
that the application of New York law was precluded on preemption grounds
since the application of New York law would have resulted in barring
arbitration.228  Finally, while feeling constrained by the FAA and the
federal cases construing it, the Victor court curiously-and in the authors'
view, correctly-expressed sympathy with Dean Witter's argument that since
"arbitrators are not frequently steeped in the law and cannot always be ex-
pected to follow its precepts. . . . [They] are wont to ignore valid statute
of limitations defenses. 229
The rationale of the Fifth District was quickly followed by the District
Court of Appeal for the Second District in Marschel v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.23 °  The Marschel court refused to allow the courts to
consider the issue of statutes of limitation, stating:
[T]he Fifth District recently decided the exact issue presented in this
case regarding whether the arbitrators or the court should decide time
bar defenses . . . .The Fifth District concluded that the arbitrators
should decide the statute of limitations issue .... We agree with the
conclusion reached in Victor ....23
223. 606 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, 614 So. 2d 502 (Fla.
1993).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 683.
226. Volt Info. Servs., Inc., 489 U.S. at 468.
227. Victor, 606 So. 2d at 685.
228. Id
229. Id.
230. 609 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla.
1993).
231. Id. at 720; see also Daugherty v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 618 So. 2d 802 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Second District Court of Appeal, relying on its holding in Marschel,
summarily reversed a circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration on statute of limitations
grounds).
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In April of this year, the Third District Court of Appeal joined the
debate,232 siding with the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in
a succinct opinion in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Clarke.233 The Clarke
court stated: "The decision below that the dispute must be arbitrated is
affirmed on the authority of... [Victor and Marschel], with which we are
in complete agreement. 234
Despite the Third District's agreement with the Victor and Marschel
decisions, one important issue raised in both cases was resolved in opposite
manners by those two courts. Both cases construed the same arbitration
clause, containing a New York choice of law provision.2" The Victor
court found that the choice of law provision was preempted by the
FAA,236 while the Marschel court found the contract did not show an
intent to apply state law and, therefore, decided that it need not determine
whether New York law would conflict with the goals and policies of the
FAA and, therefore, be preempted.237
Most recently, in a rather unusual written (and reported) opinion of a
circuit court in Paine Webber, Inc. v. Hall,238 Judge Leroy H. Moe, of the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, a court within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, openly rejected the
holdings of the Fourth District in Anstis Ornstein, Vernon and Lange and
sided with the Second, Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal holding
that the question of statutes of limitation are for the arbitrators and not for
the court under the Federal Arbitration Act.239 This case has apparently
been appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. 24' Thus, the issue
232. The Third District's position was predictable. In Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Cowan,
601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). the Third District disposed of an argument in
a federal labor law case seeking to preclude arbitration as time barred by the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Cowan court stated: "[tihat contention is a matter to
be presented to the arbitrators and is not for us to determine." Id. at 302 n.2. See also infra
note 255 and accompanying text.
233. 617 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
234. Id. But see Seaboard Surety Co. v. Cates, 604 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (citing Anstis Omstein Assoc. v. Palm Beach County, 554 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct.
App. 1989) for the proposition that timeliness of a claim for arbitration is for the courts not
the arbitrators). It is important to note, however, that this is a non-securities case to which
the FAC, and not the FAA, probably applied.
235. Victor, 606 So. 2d at 682.
236. Id. at 683.
237. Marschel, 609 So. 2d at 721.
238. [1993] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,697, at 97,237 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 28,
1993).
239. Id. at 97,239.
240. 5 Securities Arbitration Commentator 9, at II (August 1993).
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has been squarely joined; the ball so to speak is in the court of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Should the Fourth District continue in its position
taken in Anstis Ornstein, Vernon and Lange, 4' the issue, no doubt, will
ultimately be decided in the Florida Supreme Court.
Ironically, the issue of court inquiry into statutes of limitation which
the Second, Third and Fifth District courts determined to be resolved by the
dictates of the federal courts in construing the FAA, may not be so clear-cut
on the federal level. In Lawler v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 42 the court
specifically included among the duties of a court faced with a motion to stay
or compel arbitration, determination of issues of equitable defenses.243
Presumably, this would include laches. If courts have jurisdiction to
construe laches, why not statutes of limitation? Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit has, at least nominally, widened the scope of inquiry in its recent
decision in Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,144 in
holding that issues of resjudicata are properly for the court and not the
arbitrators.24 Other federal courts have, at least in part, left the door open
to judicial review of statute of limitation issues and it is difficult to say that
the issue is fully resolved at either level.246
241. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has had ample opportunity to reverse its
position. To date it has chosen not to do so. See, e.g., Investment Management & Research,
Inc. v. Wylie, Appeal No.: 92-3256, pending since November 6, 1992, before the Fourth
District. In Wylie, Judge Edward Fine of the Fifteen Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach
County, Florida enjoined an arbitration proceeding on statute of limitations grounds.
Investment Management & Research, Inc. v. Wylie, No. CL-92-6169-AN (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct.
Oct. 20, 1992) (order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). In at least two other cases, circuit
courts in the Fourth District have enjoined arbitrations based on Vernon, see Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Banks, Case No.: 92-8685 AC (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1992); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. DeGroff, Case No.: 92-00638 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1992).
242. Case No.: 91-136-CIV-FTM-17D (M.D. Fla. 1992).
243. Id. at 3.
244. 985 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993).
245. Id. at 1069; see also supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Escobar, CaseNo.: 91-1078-CIV-
T-15A (M.D. Fla. 1991). In Escobar, the district court found certain claims to be time
barred and enjoined defendants therein from prosecuting those claims in a pending NASD
arbitration. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Gimenez (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1992. In Gimenez, a New York court was asked to consider, inter
alia, whether or not arbitration between a broker and its disgruntled customer was barred by
the statute of limitations. The New York court, finding that the matter was governed by the
FAA, specifically referred the issue of statutes of limitation to the arbitrators. Interestingly,
the New York court refused to decide that the FAA and federal law applied since securities
transactions, including the mailing of monthly account statements and confirmations, involve
interstate commerce. Rather, the court found federal law applicable on the grounds of
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Another major issue confronting state courts in considering motions to
compel or stay arbitration during 1992-1993, is the issue of waiver. The
courts have ruled that, while parties may agree to arbitrate, a party seeking
to compel arbitration may waive the right by taking actions inconsistent with
the right to arbitrate.2 4 7  The general rule was clearly enunciated in Mike
Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co.: "[where] a party to a contract,
containing a provision for arbitration ...commences suit, or takes other
inconsistent action therewith, he will be held to have waived his rights to
arbitration.,, 24 ' This rule has been consistently followed by the Florida
courtS24 9 and has been specifically adopted by the Florida Supreme
diversity. The court found that the broker/dealer was a Delaware corporation and Gimenez,
the customer, a Florida resident. The court also rejected the customer's challenge to its
jurisdiction, noting that in its forum selection clause, the customer agreed to arbitration and
later chose the NASD for resolution of the dispute. Reasoning that the NASD had its
principal place of business in New York, and the customer chose a New York based entity
for his forum, the court found sufficient basis for obtaining jurisdiction over him.
The importance of Gimenezto Florida practitioners, even though the case was decided
by a New York court, is the fact that it applied federal law in refusing to determine statute
of limitations issues despite the fact that the contract contained a choice of law provision
stating that New York law would apply. Under New York law the court could dismiss
arbitration claims as time-barred. It is also important for Florida practitioners to note that
at least one court has construed a common forum selection provision to confer jurisdiction
on the courts of the state where the fora are located or have their principal place of business
to determine motions to stay or compel arbitration. The authors would note that many, if not
most, arbitration disputes arising in Florida contain similar choice of law and forum selection
provisions. In this regard, the authors direct practitioners' attention to the special concurrence
of Judge Anstead in Terminal Construction Co. v. DeSantis, 614 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). In DeSantis, Judge Anstead questioned the continuing viability of the Florida
Supreme Court decision in Damora v. Stresscon International, Inc., 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 19-
75), which held that an agreement to arbitrate in another state will not be enforced in Florida
upon the authority of section 682.02 of the Florida Statutes. In DeSantis, Judge Anstead
stated:
I do not believe the policy reasons underlying the Damora decision remain valid,
and hope both the legislature and the Florida Supreme Court would revisit the
issue. When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes, even in another state, there
is no valid reason why Florida courts, if properly called upon to to do so, should
not enforce the parties' agreement to the extent that the courts have jurisdiction
over the parties.
DeSantis, 614 So.2d at 8.
247. See, e.g., Mike Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co., 184 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
248. Id. at 913.
249. See, e.g., Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 523 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1988); R.W. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Masters
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Court.25° In Bradford, and its progeny, the courts have made clear that a
party claiming waiver of arbitration must demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an
existing right to arbitrate; and (2) commencement of suit or other acts
inconsistent with the right.2"' In Finn v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc.,252 the Fourth District Court rejected a claim that in order to find a
waiver of arbitration, a court must not only find knowledge and inconsistent
acts, but also prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.253 The Finn
court stated: "prejudice must be shown only where there is a finding of
waiver based upon delay in assertion of one's right. A showing of prejudice
is not required if waiver is based on inconsistent acts. ' 254 The Finn rule
seems to be one of lack of ambiguity; that is, the actions of one claimed to
have waived arbitration are not ambiguous but are clearly inconsistent with
that right and clearly reflect knowing waiver.5
& Co., 403 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); King v. Thompson &
McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
Seville Condo. No. 1, Inc. v. Clearwater Dev. Co., 340 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Gettles v. Commercial Bank, 276 So. 2d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Qjus Indus.. Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
250. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
251. Bradford, 184 So. 2d at 915; Kosters, 280 So. 2d at 681.
252. 523 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
253. Id. at 619.
254. Id. at 619-20.
255. See, e.g., Rosen v. Shearson, Lehman Bros., Inc., 534 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), reviewdenied, 514 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1989) (affirmative selection of a
course of action-litigation in the court-runs counter to the very purpose of arbitration);
Lapidus v. Arlen Beach Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (manifest acceptance of the judicial forum). Several cases have held that
commencing suit or answering a complaint is sufficient to waive arbitration. Ojus Indus.,
221 So. 2d at 782; Gettles, 276 So. 2d at 840; King, 352 So. 2d at 1235; Hardin Int'l, Inc.
v. Firepak, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also Handmacher v.
Campagna, 621 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed per curiam an order from the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit denying appellant's
motion to stay the lower court proceedings and compel the matter to arbitration. In
Handniacher, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging wrongdoing against her former
investment adviser, its two principals and the broker dealer through whom her trades were
placed by the advisory company. The plaintiff and three of the defendants agreed to
arbitration of their dispute. The fourth defendant objected claiming that by filing her
complaint in circuit court, the plaintiff had waived her right to arbitrate. The circuit court
agreed, and the Fourth District affirmed this ruling on appeal. Handmacher, 621 So. 2d at
445.
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The issue of the necessity of showing prejudice, where waiver of
arbitration is based merely on delay in asserting the right to arbitrate,
apparently left open in Finn, has been the subject of debate among the
district courts of appeal during the period 1992-1993. In a case involving
federal labor law, Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Cowan,5 6 the Third District
held that in cases of delay, a party opposing arbitration must additionally
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the inconsistent acts (delay).5 7
The Cowan court, recognizing that the case involved federal labor law,
applied federal substantive law to the issue of waiver of arbitration. Relying
on decisions of various federal circuit courts,258 and the now familiar
litany that doubts concerning arbitration are to be resolved in favor of
arbitrability, 259 the court, found no showing of prejudice caused by the
delay in asserting a right to arbitration, and referred the matter to arbitra-
210tion.
In 1993, the Second District Court of Appeal apparently threw down
the gauntlet, challenging the Third District's Cowan decision. In Donald &
Co. Securities, Inc. v. Mid-Florida Community Services, Inc.,261 the
Second District refused to require a showing of prejudice in order to
conclude that arbitration had been waived by inconsistent acts. 62 The
Donald & Co., court recognized the applicability of the FAA.263 Never-
theless, the court reasoned that since the United States Supreme Court had
not ruled on the necessity of showing prejudice, and since Florida courts are
bound only by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting acts of Con-
gress, it was free to ignore lower federal court precedent and apply the law
of Florida.16 ' The Second District then ruled that following Florida law:
"a party may waive arbitration by actively participating in a law suit or by
taking action inconsistent with that right .... [I]t is not necessary to show
prejudice to establish waiver ....
256. 601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
257. Id. at 302.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 709 P.2d 826 (1985)).
261. 620 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
262. Id. at 194.
263. Id. at 193.
264. id. The Second District did note that at least one federal court had held that waiver
may be found absent a showing of prejudice. See National Found. for Cancer Research v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 821 F.2d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
265. Donald & Co., 620 So. 2d at 194.
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In so holding, the court specifically noted that the Third District had
ruled to the contrary in Cowan.266 The court did conclude, however, that
while the facts in Cowan demonstrated no prejudice, the court could infer
prejudice from the facts of Donald & Co. subjudice.267 It was careful to
point out, however, that it was following the rule that a showing of
prejudice was not necessary. 68 Curiously, the Second District's decision
in Donald & Co. makes almost no reference to its decision of the prior year
in Bared & Co. v. Specialty Maintenance & Construction, Inc.,269 a non-
securities case that apparently did not involve construction of the FAA or
a review of the federal law on waiver of arbitration. In Bared, the Second
District succinctly found waiver of arbitration by the filing of an an-
swer.27° The Bared court held that the fact that appellees had both raised
the arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense in their answer and
specifically, claimed the right to arbitrate in their amended answer did not
negate their initial waiver of arbitration.2"'
The Florida courts in 1992-1993 have considered several other issues
in the context of motions to compel or stay arbitration. These include
determinations of what issues are properly the subject of arbitration, who
may demand arbitration, and whether disputes arising prior to the making
of the arbitration agreement or subsequent to the conclusion of that
agreement are properly arbitrable. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Gold-
stein,272 the court confronted the issue of whether an introducing broker
may validly enforce an arbitration agreement entered into between a
customer and a clearing broker.273 In Stratton, the customer had entered
into a customer account agreement with the clearing broker, Bear Stearns &
Co., which provided that disputes between them were to be resolved in
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 610 So. 2d I (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id.
272. 615 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
273. Id. The court explained: "The 'introducing broker' deals directly with the
customer and relays orders to the 'clearing broker,' who has access to the relevant stock ex-
changes." Id. Introducing brokers use the services of clearing brokers in order to gain access
to exchanges in which they may not be members. Frequently, in such arrangements, the
customers are required to contract directly with and be financially responsible to the clearing
broker. Typically, introducing brokers guarantee the accounts of their customers to the
clearing broker.
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arbitration. 74 Another part of the agreement provided that "[y]ou agree
that your broker (including Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.) is a third party
beneficiary of this agreement, and that the terms and conditions hereof,
including the arbitration provision, shall be applicable to all matters between
or among any of you . . ,*""' Finding that the introducing broker,
Stratton, was a third party beneficiary of the contract, and that the contract
clearly covered the controversy between the parties, the Third District
reversed the trial court decision refusing to compel arbitration and remanded
with directions to refer the matter to arbitration.276
Florida courts were also asked to construe what claims were properly
determined in arbitration. In Pierce v. J. W. Charles-Bush Securities,
Inc., 77 the court readily determined that parties could agree to grant
arbitrators authority to award attorney fees stating: "If civil rights, antitrust
and securities fraud claims are not inappropriate for arbitration, it is very
difficult to imagine a civil claim in which an agreement to arbitrate would
not be enforced. 278 Perhaps mindful of the Fourth District's admonitions
in Pierce, the circuit court for Indian River County, in an action brought
before it, issued an order compelling arbitration.279 In Noe v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,28° the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's order compelling arbitration. The court stated in a succinct per
curiam opinion: "We reject appellees' argument that subsequent federal
cases require us to depart from the holding expressed in Montgomery Dis-
tributors.,,28  In Montgomery Distributors, Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co., Inc.,282 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that: (1) antitrust
claims were not a proper subject for arbitration; and (2) the doctrine of
permeation did not require a stay of arbitration of breach of contract claims
pending a trial on antitrust issues. 23  The doctrine of permeation has
subsequently been rejected on the federal level. 284 To the extent that the
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Stratton, 615 So. 2d at 184.
277. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
278. Id. at 628; see supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
279. SeeNoe v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 599 So. 2d 786 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
280. 599 So. 2d 786 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
281. Id. (citing Montgomery Distrib., Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 505 So.
2d 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
282. 505 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
283. Id. at 445.
284. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). If arbitrable
claims were so intertwined with nonarbitrable claims that the arbitrators could not reasonably
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Fourth District's decision in Noe reflects a conflict with its own decision in
Pierce, it is an anomaly. 85
In Bachus & Stratton, Inc. v. Mann,"6 the Fourth District compelled
arbitration of Title VII sex discrimination and various common law claims
against a broker/dealer and its registered representatives." 7 The court also
compelled arbitration of the claims against the broker/dealer's parent
company, holding that the issue of whether it was vicariously liable for the
acts of its agents is properly referable to arbitration.28
In Bachus & Stratton, the Fourth District was also required to consider
the issue of the arbitrability of claims which arose after the termination of
appellee's employment by the appellants, and thus, arguably after the
extinction of the agreement between them to arbitrate.289 The Fourth
District upheld the trial court's ruling that the arbitration agreement did not
apply to claims which arose after the termination of appellee's employ-
ment.29 °
The Fourth District, without reference to same, apparently followed its
holding in Bachus & Stratton in its decision in Chelsea Street Securities,
Inc. v. Cawthon,"' issued on the same day. In Chelsea, the Fourth
District in a per curiam opinion affirmed, without opinion, a lower court's
refusal to compel arbitration of a suit by a former employee of a securities
brokerage firm alleging slander and infliction of emotional distress.292
The alleged conduct giving rise to the suit apparently occurred some ten
days after the employee resigned.293
resolve the former without consideration of the latter, courts would require a stay of
arbitration pending resolution of the non-arbitrable matters at trial.
285. Since the circuit court ruling in Noe is unreported, and the Fourth District opinion
sheds no light on the issues considered by the circuit court, it is arguable that the decision
is unique to its facts and does not reflect a retreat from the court's position in Pierce. It is
important to note, however, that the court's broad statement in Pierce may not have been
entirely accurate. In its decision in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the Supreme Court
noted that its ruling that antitrust claims were arbitrable was limited to cases involving
international arbitrations. See supra note 184.
286. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1275 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993).
287. Id.
288. Id.; see also Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992)
(compelling arbitration of Title VII claims); supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
289. Bachus, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1275.
290. Id.
291. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1272 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993).
292. Id.
293. Id
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Notwithstanding his concurrence in Bachus & Stratton, which held that
claims arising after termination of employment were not subject to
arbitration, Judge Farmer of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, inexplica-
bly wrote a scathing dissent in Chelsea. Judge Farmer reasoned that the
arbitration clause at issue in Chelsea, even though it was identical to the
arbitration clause in Bachus,"' was in fact broad enough to encompass
post employment disputes, so long as they arose "out of, or in connection
with, the business of the firm."29 Judge Farmer noted the liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration set forth in the FAA and the case law requiring
that all doubts be resolved in favor of arbitration rather than against it.296
Relying on the court's previous holding in Pierce, Judge Farmer stated:
"Manifestly, there is nothing inherent in slander or infliction of emotional
distress claims that precludes arbitration. Or, to put it another way, there
is nothing about such claims that requires a court in preference to an
arbitration forum. 297
In summary, Judge Farmer stated:
I do note that the employee's causes of action all arose after his
employment relationship with the firm had already terminated. I do not
understand why the date of the employee's termination of employment
might be thought to determine whether the claims are arbitrable.9
In light of his same day concurrence in the Bachus decision, which held
directly to the contrary, Judge Farmer's Chelsea dissent is an apparent
anomaly.
In Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Segal,299 the Fourth District
was confronted with a similar issue to that raised in Bachus & Stratton and
Chelsea."' In Segal, the brokerage firm sought retroactive application of
an agreement to arbitrate.3"' The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
294. Both cases construed the NASD Form U-4 agreement to "arbitrate any dispute,
claim, or controversy that may arise between me and my firm . .. that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules ... of the organizations with which I register." Bachus, 18 Fla.
L. Weekly at D1275; Chelsea, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1272.
295. Chelsa, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1272.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 603 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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the lower court ruling refusing to apply the subsequent arbitration agreement
to pre-employment disputes." 2
The second major focus of judicial review of arbitration decisions in
the period 1992-1993 in Florida, has been the extent, manner and grounds
for judicial review of arbitration decisions. This category can be loosely
termed post-arbitration review. In this context, Florida courts on both the
state and federal level have considered issues relating to the vacatur of
arbitration awards as well as the grounds and standards of review to be
applied in doing so. Three principal cases concerning this issue reached the
Eleventh Circuit in 1992-1993. The first two were Ainsworth v: Skur-
nick,30 3 ("Ainsworth IX') a case having its genesis in the Southern District
of Florida,3"4 and Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc.3"5 Brown in-
volved a review of a decision of the District Court for the Middle District
of Florida." 6 Curiously, both Ainsworth and Brown involved the construc-
tion of Florida Statutes section 517.12 relating to the unregistered sale of
securities in Florida.30 7 The third case, Robbins v. Day,38 arose out of
the vacatur of an arbitration award by the United District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama in a case primarily concerning Alabama blue
sky violations.
3 9
The FAA makes specific provision for vacatur of arbitration awards by
302. Id. The court held that the broker's subsequent agreement to arbitrate, which was
executed incident to the broker's registration afterhis employment dispute with the brokerage
firm, does not constitute an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising prior to registration. Id.
The court found that "[t]he rules of the NASD and NYSE do not provide that a registrant's
agreement to arbitrate disputes applies retroactively." Segal, 603 So. 2d at 689.
303. 960 F.2d 939 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1269 (1993).
304. Id.
305. 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C508 (I Ith Cir. July 2, 1993).
306. ld; see Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., [19921 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,935, at 93,956 (M.D. Fla. 1992), wherein Judge Elizabeth Kovachevich of the Middle
District issued a typically well reasoned and well written opinion which thoroughly
summarizes the law to that time of judicial review of arbitration decisions in the Eleventh
Circuit.
307. Brown, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at C508; Ainsworth, 960 F.2d at 939.
308. 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
309. Id. The district court vacated an arbitration award in the amount of $325,000 since
the arbitrators' decision did not explain their rationale for determining liability or their
methodology for imposing damages. Id. at 681. Claimants originally sought 4.2 million
dollars in actual damages, 12 million in punitive damages and 12.6 million dollars in RICO
damages, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses totalling over 26.8 million dollars in damages.
Id. at 681 n.I.
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the district courts in section 10 thereof.310 However, the grounds provided
by section 10 are extremely limited.31' Specifically, section 10 enumerates
four grounds for vacating an arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing . . . or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (4)
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.3 2
Given the limited grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards specified
in United States Code Title 9, section 10, it is perhaps not surprising that
several federal courts have fashioned other grounds to vacate awards. The
first of these judicially crafted means allows vacatur if the arbitrators' award
is "arbitrary or capricious."' 1 3  Another ground is when a court finds an
award "violates public policy., 3 4  Another ground cited by the courts is
that the award is "irrational." '3 15 The final method crafted by the courts
to vacate arbitration awards is upon a finding that the award was rendered
in "manifest disregard of the law. 316
The Eleventh Circuit has been considering the manifest disregard
standard without specifically adopting same since its decision in O.R.
Securities, Inc. v. Professional Planning Associates,3 7 in 1988.38 Given
the Eleventh Circuit's relatively long term flirtation with the manifest
disregard standard, it was inevitable that a district court below would vacate
an arbitration award on the grounds of manifest disregard of the law, and
310. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1412, (11th Cir. 1990).
314. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (11 th Cir.
1988).
315. See lema v. Arthur Murray, Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1987).
316. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs. Inc., 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir.
1988). In O.R. Sec., the Eleventh Circuit discussed the manifest disregard standard noting
that it had never adopted same. Id. at 747.
317. 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988).
318. Id.; see Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1412-16.
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that the decision would be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. In Ainsworth
v. Skurnick ("Ainsworth 1"), the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida did just that and the case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.319
In Ainsworth I, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an order of the Southern
District vacating an arbitration award in which a customer sued a broker
alleging inter alia that the broker was not registered to sell securities in
Florida, and that, despite the fact that his office was in New York, his
effectuation of the Florida customer's orders constituted the sale of securities
in Florida by an unregistered person, in violation of Florida Statutes section
517.12.320 The arbitration panel refused to award damages. On appeal, the
district court specified the elements of a section 5 17.12 violation, including
an instruction that a finding of scienter was unnecessary and remanded to
the arbitrators for a clarification of their decision.32' The panel responded
that although the broker had acted negligently, the claimant had suffered no
damages, and no violation of section 517.12 had been proven.322 The
district court, reviewing the transcript of the arbitration proceeding de novo,
determined that there had clearly been a violation of Florida Statutes section
517.12, and vacated the arbitration award as being in manifest disregard of
the law.323 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, was unable to ascertain the
status of the law concerning this statute from Florida court decisions, and
therefore certified, in Ainsworth 1, the question of whether the broker's
conduct constituted a violation of section 517.12 to the Florida Supreme
Court.3 24 The Florida Supreme Court held that the District Court had been
correct.3 25 The case again went to the Eleventh Circuit.3 26
In Ainsworth II, the Eleventh Circuit, armed with the opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court, affirmed the district court's vacatur, 27 but rejected
the court's use of the manifest disregard standard, again noting that it had
never adopted that standard as a ground for vacating arbitration awards.328
The Ainsworth H court did adopt the arbitrary or capricious standard as a
non-statutory ground upon which courts could, under proper circumstances,
319. 909 F. 2d 456 (1 th Cir. 1990).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 457.
323. Id.
324. Ainsworth I, 909 F.2d at 456.
325. Skumick v. Ainsworth, 591 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1991).
326. Ainsworth 11, 960 F.2d at 939.
327. Id. at 941.
328. Id.
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vacate an arbitration award.329  Defining the arbitrary or capricious
standard as one in which "'a ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be
inferred from the facts of the case,""'33 the court explained that, since the
district court correctly instructed the arbitrators on the law, and they
nevertheless refused to apply it properly, the refusal to grant damages was
arbitrary and capricious.33" ' The Ainsworth II court stated: "In this case,
it is not a question of deciding the law and getting it wrong or for some
reason disregarding the law. The decision was simply an apparent arbitrary
and capricious denial of relief with no factual or legal basis." '332
Prior to Ainsworth II, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's
decision in Robbins, which held the actions of an arbitration panel to be in
manifest disregard of the law since a review of the record supported a
finding of fraud, and yet the arbitrators refused to apply a mandatory
damages provisions of the Alabama Securities Act.333 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, reversed.334  The court stated: "[f]ollowing Eleventh
Circuit precedent, we decline to adopt the manifest disregard of the law
standard." '335 The Robbins court did not completely reject the idea of
judicial grounds for vacatur; instead, it declared that the court could look
beyond the statutory grounds of the FAA "[o]nly after it is determined that
there could be no proper basis for the award .... ""'
Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement in Robbins, the
district court in Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc.,337 found that the
arbitrators below had a "proper basis" for their award since the issue of
what constituted a violation of Florida Statutes section 517.12 was not clear
at the time of the Brown arbitration, and the arbitrators' interpretation of the
law was reasonable.33 Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court finding, it noted that by inquiring into whether the arbitrators had a
329. Id.
330. Id. at 941 (quoting Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1413).
331. Ainsworth IA 960 F.2d at 941.
332. Id.
333. Robbins v. Paine Webber, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 773, 777 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
334. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
335. Id. at 684. As discussed above, it is not at all clear to the authors and, presumably
to the district court in Robbins, that this was the case. See O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 42;
Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1410.
336. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 684.
337. [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,935, at 93,956 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
338. Id. at 93,962.
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proper basis, the district court abused its discretion!339  The Eleventh
Circuit instructed that, since the arbitrators stated the rationale for their
decision, the district court should have confined its consideration to
appellant's contentions that the award was arbitrary, capricious and contrary
to public policy. 4°
If any bright line can be determined from these cases, it is that the
Eleventh Circuit has nominally rejected the manifest disregard standard for
judicial review of arbitrations and directed the district courts to be extremely
circumspect in vacating arbitration awards' To this end, the court in
Robbins directed the district courts to review arbitration decisions under the
abuse of discretion standard; that is, to uphold arbitration decisions if any
basis can be inferred for the arbitrators' decision, while warning that it
would review any vacatur of an arbitration award de novo.a4' While the
dictates of the Eleventh Circuit are far from clear, by its failure to reject all
judicially crafted grounds for review of arbitration decisions, and to allow
vacatur solely on the grounds provided in 9 U.S.C., section 10, the court
arguably encouraged the district courts to continue vacating arbitration
awards under proper circumstances.
One other decision of the federal courts concerning post-arbitration
review is of note. Again, the opinion was written by Judge Elizabeth A.
Kovachevich of the Middle District of Florida. In In re Arbitration between
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. & Depew, 342 the court vacated an
arbitration award of attorney fees awarded by an AAA panel.343 In
Depew, claimants alleged their investment accounts had been mishandled in
violation of various statutes, including section 517.211(6) of the Florida
Statutes and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule l0b-5,344 and
alleged various common law causes of action.345 In their statement of
claim, the Depews requested attorneys fees for the lob-5 allegations and for
violation of chapter 517, but did not request attorney fees for the common
law causes.3 46  Notwithstanding, the arbitrators awarded damages and
attorney fees despite finding the broker had committed no statutory viola-
339. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C508, 509 (11 th
Cir. July 2, 1993).
340. Id.
341. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 681.
342. 814 F. Supp. 1081 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
343. Id
344. 17 C.F.R. §240.10(b)(5) (1992).
345. Depew, 814 F. Supp. at 1082.
346. Id.
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tions.3" The court, noting that under the American Rule, attorneys fees
awards are improper unless provided by statute or contract, also recognized
that even if an arbitration clause in a contract is ambiguous, but can be read
to include an award of attorney fees, the court will not vacate an arbitration
award of attorney fees made under the contract) 48 The court determined
that the Depew panel found no statutory violations and, therefore, it could
not have awarded attorney fees pursuant to the statute.349 It also found
that the contract did not provide for attorneys fees and held that even though
the contract incorporated AAA rules, and that Rule 43 of the AAA arguably
provides for the award of attorneys fees, the Rule failed to grant the
arbitrators the power to award attorneys' fees. 50 Presumably the court
found that such a tortured construction of the contract failed to demonstrate
a clear intent of the parties to empower the arbitrators to award attorneys
fees.
The state courts have also reviewed arbitration decisions and awards
during the period 1992-1993 and have focused on many of the same issues
as the federal courts. For example, several cases have addressed the issue
of the propriety of arbitrators awarding attorneys fees. In Pierce v. J. W.
Charles-Bush Securities, Inc.,5 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
concluded that there was no reason not to allow parties to submit attorneys'
fees claims to arbitration if they so desired since applicable statutes do not
evidence a legislative intent to require that all attorneys fees be determined
by a judge.352 In a well reasoned opinion, Judge Farmer explained that
the court's decision in Pierce, allowing for an award of attorneys fees, was
a retreat from the court's prior opinion in Loxahatchee River Environmental
Control District v. Guy Villa & Sons, Inc..5 In Loxahatchee River, the
court construed the plain language of section 682.02 of the Florida
Statutes,35 4 and deemed that arbitrators could not award attorneys fees.355
In Pierce, Judge Farmer noted the change at both the federal and state level
in the judicial view of arbitration since the time of the Loxahatchee decision
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Depew, 814 F. Supp. at 1083-84 (stating, "Rule 43 does not grant unlimited power
to the arbitrators. The rule allows arbitrators to grant only those awards which are 'within
the scope of the agreement between the parties."').
351. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
352. Id. at 630-31.
353. 371 So. 2d 111 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
354. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1975).
355. Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist., 371 So. 2d at 1113.
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and determined that if ambiguous, statutes should be construed to favor
arbitration.356 The court instructed, "[a]ny legislative mandate to force
contracting parties to a courtroom for legal fees should thus be stated in
language far more clearly requiring that result than the current text of FAC
Section 682.18(1).""' 7 Based on this reasoning, the Pierce court conclud-
ed that appropriately read, the Florida Arbitration Code ("FAC") precludes
the arbitrators from awarding attorney fees "but not when the parties have
specifically agreed to submit the fee issue to arbitration.358  The court
questioned whether, in light of the clear federal mandate favoring arbitra-
tion, any civil claim could not be subject to arbitration upon the agreement
of the parties." 9 It is significant to note that despite the fact that Pierce
involved a typical securities related arbitration between a customer and a
broker, neither party argued the applicability of the FAA. Because the
record was silent, the court, although itself remarking upon the likely
applicability of the FAA, considered the question solely under Florida
law.36° Florida courts, during 1992-93 entertained several issues concern-
356. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 629.
357. Id. at 630.
358. Id. at 631.
359. Id. at 628. See also supra text accompanying notes 177-83.
360. Id. It appears that appellants got lucky. While the Pierce court recognized that
"[u]nder the previously cited Supreme Court decisions, we have little doubt that Congress has
barred the states from refusing to enforce arbitration awards under ... [the FAA] which
determine entitlement to attorney's fees." Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 628. Appellants apparently
chose not to seek confirmation of the award under the FAA and, thus, were required to hope
that the Fourth District would reverse its prior Loxahatchee decision. Fortunately for them,
that is precisely what the court did. Id. Three months later, in Paston & Coffman, M.D.S.,
P.A., v. Katzen, 610 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the Fourth District, in a non-
securities case, followed its judgment in Pierce,by upholding an arbitration award of attorney
fees based upon the arbitrators' determination that the parties stipulated during the hearing
that the arbitrators could determine the issue of attorneys' fees. The Second District Court
of Appeal, on the other hand, in Fridman v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1128, 1129
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), determined that under the FAC, arbitrators were not
empowered to award attorney fees. On motion for rehearing, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal reviewed its decision in Paston & Coffman, M.D.S., and amended its determination
to certify that its decision was in conflict with Fridman, apparently setting the stage for a
determination by the Florida Supreme Court of the issue. Paston & Coffman M.D.S., P.A.,
610 So. 2d at :513. Finally, in Consolidated Southern Security, Inc. v. Geniac & Associates,
Inc., 619 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the Second District again, in a non-
securities case, confronted the issue of how attorneys fees should be awarded by the trial
court. Noting that in the case before it one party prevailed on six of seven claims, the court
instructed that the attorneys fees should be considered for each claim including an allocation
or time spent on all claims and that the trial court erred in attempting to net out fees. Id. at
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ing vacatur and the standards to be applied. In Lee v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,36 1 the Second District Court of Appeal refused to conclude
that an AAA arbitration panel's denial of a continuance constituted arbitrator
misconduct such that under section 10(c) of the FAA, its decision should be
reversed by the court.362 The first question confronted by the Lee court
was whether on issues of vacatur, the FAA preempted or superseded the
FAC.363 The court quickly resolved this issue stating, "[a]s this court has
previously determined, the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes the Florida
Arbitration Code when interstate commerce is involved." '36 4 The Lee court
then determined that the trial court exceeded its authority, in taking evidence
which went beyond that presented to the arbitrators, in its inquiry into the
reasons for a requested continuance.365 The court stated: "[t]he trial court
was not authorized to delve beyond [the] ... record and second guess the
AAA on evidence which the AAA did not have the benefit of when it made
its ruling. 36 6  Instead, the Second District Court of Appeal determined
that the AAA's refusal to grant a continuance was not, based on the limited
information presented to it, an "abuse of discretion, i.e. 'misconduct,' on the
part of the AAA. ' 3 67 Thus, the Second District made clear that the trial
court's proper role in reviewing arbitrations is not de novo review but rather
a summary review of the record to determine whether or not there had been
an abuse of discretion.368
1028. The court instructed that the trial court must consider each claim separately and ac-
count for time spent by the opposing party on the claim on which it prevailed as well. Id. at
1028-29.
361. 594 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
362. Id. at 784-85.
363. Id. at 785.
364. Id.; see also supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text; Marschel v. Dean Wiiter
Reynolds, Inc., 17 Fla. L. Weekly D2722; Daugherty v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1992); 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1385 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. June 4,
1993). Thus, it appears that in the Second District Court of Appeal, at least, securities cases
will be solely governed by the FAA. See id. The court's summary determination of this
issue perhaps ignores the instruction of the United States Supreme Court in Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1988), to the effect
that the FAA is only intended to preempt state law when that state law offends the
congressional purposes behind the FAA. Id. at 477.
365. Lee, 594 So. 2d at 785.
366. Id. The state court's decision clearly reflects the limited scope of review available
to trial courts on issues of vacatur. See id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
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The scope of review of arbitration decisions by the circuit courts was
also the subject of the Third District Court's opinion in Okun v. Litwin
Securities, Inc.3 6 9  In Okun, the court enunciated perhaps the most strin-
gent standard found in any of the decisions on the state or federal level
construing the scope of review of arbitration awards.37 Recognizing that
the FAC provided five grounds for vacating an arbitration award,37 ' the
court pronounced: "[i]n the absence of one of those five grounds, the trial
court does not have the authority to vacate the arbitration award." '372
Thus, the Third District Court of Appeal appears to have eliminated
judicially crafted grounds for vacatur entirely.37 3 While the authors are
unaware of any other court applying quite such a stringent standard, and it
is important to note that the Okun court was not faced with a judicially
created basis for vacatur, the concept of narrow review of arbitration awards
prevails both on the federal and state level.374
369. 619 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. Ct. 1993).
370. Id.
371. Section 682.13(1) of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award when: (a) The
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means. (b) There was
evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of
the arbitrators or umpire or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party. (c)
The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction exceeded their
powers. (d) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted
the hearing, contrary to the provisions of s.682.06, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party. (e) There was no agreement or provision for arbitration
subject to this law, unless the matter was determined in proceedings under
s.682.03 and unless the party participated in the arbitration hearing without
raising the objection.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13(1) (1991). The grounds for vacatur under scction 682.13 Florida
Statutes are similar to those under 9 U.S.C. § 10 of the FAA. The most notable difference
is subsection (e) of section 682.13(1) allowing the court on motion to vacate to again
determine the validity of the making of an agreement to arbitrate.
372. Okun, 619 So. 2d at 995.
373. Id. But compare the trial court's determination in Raymond James & Assoc., Inc.
v. Deutsch, Case No. 92-08793 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. April 28, 1993), in which the court
conducted a full evidentiary hearing (and allowed depositions) in vacating an arbitral decision
on grounds of arbitral bias or "evident partiality." It is logical that a more in depth court
inquiry is appropriate where the issue is bias.
374. See, e.g., Applewhite v. Sheen Fin. Resources, Inc., 608 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992). In Applewhite, the circuit court upheld an injunction granted by an
arbitration panel enforcing a non-competition agreement and employment contract between
a broker and its registered representatives. Id. While the trial court did modify the
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Finally, state courts have been asked during 1992-1993 to consider and
determine the timing of review of an order vacating arbitration. In
Raymond James & Associates, Inc. v. Deutsch,75 the Fourth District dis-
missed the appeal of a lower court's vacatur of an arbitration award, on
grounds of evident partiality or bias of the arbitrator, holding that the
vacatur order was non-final and therefore not appealable on an interlocutory
basis.376 The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in a non-securities case, also
considered the issue of whether a trial court order vacating an arbitration
award and ordering a re-hearing is a final appealable order.377 In Central
Florida Police Benevolent Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of Orlando,378 the court,
following the Fourth District Court of Appeal, ruled that it was not a final
appealable order.379
An emerging area of judicial concern in Florida involves what has
come to be known as the "economic loss rule." The economic loss rule had
its genesis in Florida in a case certified to the Supreme Court by the
Eleventh Circuit entitled AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co.38° and the Supreme Court's previous decision in Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.3"' In those cases, the
Florida Supreme Court enunciated the rule that parties could not recover in
tort for damages arising solely out of a contractual relationship between the
injunction, which was again modified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, nevertheless
the Fourth District instructed, "[w]e note first that the standard ofjudicial review applicable
to challenges of an arbitration award is very limited .... Id. at 83; see also Goldman v.
Chang, 622 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In Goldman, the Third District Court
of Appeal reversed the trial court's attempt to award damages in a case in which the
arbitrators had determined the percentage interest of a minority shareholder in a close
corporation. Id. at 31. The trial court had requested the arbitrators to clarify whether they
intended to enter a damage award and if so, against which parties. The arbitrators responded
that they had not intended to enter a damage award, they had only computed the value of
shareholders' interest. Nevertheless the trial court entered judgment awarding the plaintiff
damages. Id. at 30-31. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court noting
that "the trial court was without power, authority, or jurisdiction to enter an award of
damages" in light of the ruling of the arbitration panel. Id. at 31.
375. Unpublished order, Case No.: 92-01953 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993).
376. Id.; accordCity of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582
So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
377. Central Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'nv. City of Orlando, 614 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1204.
380. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
381. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
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parties.382 Thus, the rule has developed that where a plaintiff fails to
allege and prove the existence of a tort independent of the contractual
breach, it cannot recover economic damages under a tort theory.383 The
economic loss rule was soon applied in the securities context. The courts,
recognizing that the essential relationship between customer and broker is
contractual, have continued to limit non-contractual grounds for suits
between broker/dealers and their customers.384
During 1992-1993 at least two federal courts have considered the
application of the economic loss rule in the context of securities claims and
curiously, at least one state court which might have, has not been required
to do so. In City of Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers 'Retirement Trust
v. Invesco MIM, Inc.,385 the trial court was requested to consider the
application on a motion to dismiss of plaintiffs claim of tort damages
resulting from defendants alleged wanton, willful and reckless conduct in
speculative investments in plaintiffs account.386  The Southern District
court, reviewing the case law concerning the economic loss rule, construed
the law, stating:
no independent tort can exist solely for contractually based economic
damages, absent personal injury or damage to property other than that
which was subject to the contract .... If a claimant, however, does not
have a contractual remedy because no contract exists, then this lack of
alternate means of recovery provides claimant with an exception to the
economic loss rule. 81
382. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
383. See. e.g., Interstate Sec. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 774 (11 th Cir. 1991).
384. See, e.g., id (refusing to allow claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligence
in light of the contractual relationship between the parties); seealsoZitrin v. Raymond James
& Assocs., Inc., CaseNo.: CL-91-13284-AF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 1992) (unpublished
order striking civil theft, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims); Tietig v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Case No.: 89-1572-CIV-MARCUS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 1991) (barring negli-
gence, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims); Dziabis v. Gandolfo, Case No.: 90-402-
CIV-T-10 (C) (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 1991) (holding that allegations in complaint that defendant
was a paid professional investment advisor created a contractual relationship as a matter of
law and then applying the economic loss rule to bar claims of common law fraud, negligence,
and breach of fiduciary duty).
385. 789 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
386. Id. at 393.
387. Id. at 393-94 (citation omitted). Butsee Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley
Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1993) (overturning Latite Roofing Co.
v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) wherein the exception to the
economic loss rule relied upon by the Southern District of Florida in Invesco was enunciated).
In Casa Clara, the Florida Supreme Court denied a tort remedy to a homeowner against a
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Relying on the economic loss rule the Southern District court dismissed the
trust's tort allegations stating that the plaintiffs could seek recovery through
a claim for breach of contract.388
In BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc.,389 the Elev-
enth Circuit had occasion to consider the scope of the Florida economic loss
rule. In BankAtlantic, the bank sued Paine Webber who had served as its
investment advisor and had also served as a broker for BankAtlantic in
certain securities transactions. 39" BankAtlantic sued Paine Webber over
the securities transactions alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and
fraud.3 9' A jury returned a verdict in favor of the broker and an appeal
was taken.392 The broker claimed that the bank's appeal was moot since
the underlying claims were barred by Florida's economic loss rule. 393 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, in dicta noting that the broker had argued until
its brief on appeal that the brokerage transactions were outside of the
contract for investment advisory services. 9 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit decided the claims were not barred by the economic loss rule. 395
The final case regarding economic loss is interesting primarily for the
fact that the defense was apparently not raised. In Csordas v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., Inc.,396 the customer sued a brokerage firm and its
account executive trainee for losses suffered on a bond purchase recom-
supplier of concrete used by the developer to build the homeowner's residence. Id. at 1246-
67. The court did so even though by limiting the action to contract, the homeowner arguably
was denied relief since he was not in privity with the supplier and even though, as the dissent
correctly points out, in supplying defective concrete the supplier could reasonably have
foreseen that the homebuyer would have been the party likely to have been injured. Id. at
1249 (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting).
388. Invesco MIM, Inc., 789 F. Supp. at 394.
389. 955 F.2d 1467 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 966 (1993).
390. Id. at 1469-70.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1470.
393. Id. at 1476.
394. BankAtlantic, 955 F.2d at 1476.
395. Id. It is interesting to note that the court apparently did not consider whether the
brokerage relationship between Paine Webber and BankAtlantic, which resulted in the
disputed securities transactions, was itself contractual in nature albeit under a separate
contract from the investment advisory contract. See id Arguably, the brokerage contract
would have served to deny BankAtlantic its tort claims against Paine Webber. It is unclear
from the opinion whether or not Paine Webber raised this argument.
396. [1992-93] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,230, at 94,999 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. July 16,
1992).
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mended to the customer by the trainee.397 The customer sued the bro-
ker/dealer and the trainee alleging violation of chapter 517, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and common law fraud.3 98
The trial court sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff on breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence and for the defendants on the other
counts.399 The opinion contains no reference whatsoever to the economic
loss doctrine and one can only conjecture whether it was raised in prelimi-
nary matters or at the trial by either the defendants or the court. It is
possible that in finding for the defendants on breach of contract, the court
determined that there was no contract between the parties which would
preclude the tort claims. However, such a ruling would ignore written docu-
ments and the essential nature of the relationship between broker and
customer recognized by so many of the Florida courts.4"0 The case does
contain a good explanation of the nature and scope of the fiduciary duty
owed by broker to customer as that law has developed in Florida and
elsewhere.40' This case demonstrates the continuing, if improper, viability
of actions based on such duties.40 2 Notwithstanding the Csordas decision,
the practitioner should not underestimate the effect of the economic loss rule
on securities litigation in Florida.0 3
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See Central Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 614 So. 2d
1203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also Okun v. Litwin Sec. Inc., 619 So. 2d 995 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
401. Csordas, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,230, at 94,999.
402. Id. The case indicates that the trainee had not studied the bonds he recommended
and only knew what his computer displayed. He did not obtain a pricing history, which was
available in the computer. Apparently, he did not consult Moody's Bonds Ratings, which
indicated that the bonds had speculative elements. The court also faulted the trainee for not
consulting Standard and Poor's Corporation Records available in his office, which would
have indicated that the corporation, whose bonds were recommended by him, had substantial
holdings in real-estate and savings and loan institutions which the court found were in
financial trouble at the time. Id. at 95,000. The opinion is silent on whether the trainee
found the bonds on the employer's recommended list or whether simply recommending a
security found on such a list would have satisfied his duty to the customer. It is interesting
to note that the broker, itself was only found vicariously liable for the negligence and breach
of fiduciary duty of its trainee. From this, one can infer that the security was not on its
recommended list and that the court did not have before it or consider the issue of negligent
supervision. Id. at 94,999-95,000.
403. Inter alia, by limiting securities controversies to actions in contract, litigation will
be streamlined. Presumably, such a limitation will also eliminate or virtually eliminate
awards of punitive damages in securities cases. It is even questionable whether parties could
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The third major focus of Florida courts in securities cases decided in
1992-1993 may generally be classified as non-arbitration cases. They cover
numerous subjects under the state and federal securities laws. In 1992, the
Eleventh Circuit joined the growing number of courts which have upheld the
constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,404
in its decision in Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.4"5 In Lampf Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson,"6 the Supreme Court rejected
the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitation for private causes of
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.40 7 Instead the Court held that
the one year/three year statute of limitations applicable to express private
rights of action under other sections of the 1934 Act governed 10(b) actions
and that the Lampf rule should be retroactively applied in that case.40 8 In
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,40 9 announced the same day as
Lampf the Supreme Court held that when the Court applies a new rule to
litigants in a particular case, that rule must be retroactively applied to all
other similarly situated litigants. 410 In 1992, in Lujkin v. McCallum,41'
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Beam required retroactive application of the
new statute of limitations rule announced in Lampf 4 2 Thereafter, Con-
gress amended the 1934 Act by specifically providing in Section 27A that
private civil actions implied under Section 10(b) begun before June 19, 1991
were to be governed by the limitations period provided by the laws
applicable to the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991. 4 11
Section 27A also provided that cases dismissed as time-barred subsequent
to June 19, 1991, which would have been timely filed under the limitation
provision provided by laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws
contract for the award of punitive damages. See also supra notes 102-13 and accompanying
text.
404. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-I (West 1993).
405. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
406. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (superseded by statute as recognized in, National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Califinvest, No. CIV 2476, 1992 WL (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
1992)).
407. Id. at 2781-82.
408. Id
409. 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991) (superseded by statute as recognized in, Ahmed v. Trupin,
781 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
410. Id at 2441.
411. 956 F.2d 1104 (11 th Cir. 1992) (superseded by statute as recognized in, Henderson
v. Scientific-Atlanta, 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993)).
412. Id. at 1108.
413. Securities Exchange Act 1934, § 27A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-I (West 1993).
[Vol. 18
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/3
Winikoff / Bradford
existed on that date, must be reinstated on motion.414 Thus Section 27A
amounted to a Congressional reversal of the retroactivity rulings of the
Supreme Court in Lampf and Beam, at least as to 10(b) actions.
In Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta,1 5 the Eleventh Circuit considered
a case in which the plaintiff had filed a class action securities claim against
the defendant in September, 1988 alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act."16 After the action was filed, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Lampf and Scientific-Atlanta moved for summary judgment on
time-bar grounds.' 7  The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant on the federal securities laws claims and dismissed the
pendent state law claims without prejudice.4 8 The plaintiffs then appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit.4" 9 While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Section 27A.420  Scientific-Atlanta argued that Section 27A
violated the separation of powers doctrine because Congress sought to
render Lampf a nullity.42' Appellee also contended that Section 27A was
unconstitutional because it operated to deny it due process since Congress
intended in enacting Section 27A to direct the outcome of pending
litigation. The court rejected both constitutional challenges, finding first
that Congress has the right under our federal system to amend a statute as
it sees fit if it disagrees with a court's interpretation of that statute,423 and
second that the fact that the statute had an effect upon pending litigation
does not constitute a due process violation.42 4 Appellees made two other
attacks upon the constitutionality of the statute, the first, also on due process
grounds, alleging that the statute made no attempt to define what would be
an appropriate limitations period.425  The court summarily disagreed,
stating that under the statute, the limitations period is clear.426 The court,
in similar summary fashion, disposed of an argument claiming the statute
414. Id. § 78aa-1 (not later than 60daysafter the date of enactment of§ 78aa-1 [enacted
Dec. 19, 1991]).
415. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
416. Id. at 1568.
417. Id. at 1569.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1570.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1573.
424. Id. at 1574.
425. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574.
426. Id.
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violated appellee's right to equal protection noting that the statute must be
upheld as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.427 The court found protecting litigants from an unexpected
change in the law to be a legitimate governmental interest and that Section
27A is rationally related to that end.4 28  The court also found that the
equal protection clause was not offended by the fact that plaintiffs in
different areas would, under Section 27A, have different statutes of
limitation. The court concluded that there is nothing irrational about
borrowing statutes of limitation in cases where Congress has failed to
provide one.4 29 The court also found it rational for Congress to conclude
that litigants not already in court on June 19, 1991 were not in need of the
protection offered by the statute.430 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit became the
first court of appeal to address the constitutionality of Section 27A.
Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta arose in the context of a securities
class-action suit. During the period 1992-1993, the Eleventh Circuit had
occasion to consider one other securities class-action suit of note and one
district court has written two cogent opinions in the area. In In re US. Oil
& Gas Litigation v. Wolfson,43 1 the court upheld a determination by Judge
William H. Hoeveler of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida enforcing a bar order against a settling defendant on a
cross-claim.432  In In re US. Oil & Gas Litigation, the lower court was
faced with an incredibly complex case.433 One defendant settled, carefully
preserving its rights to cross-claim against another of the defendants.434
Notwithstanding, when the second defendant settled it asked the court to bar
the cross-claim. 435 The district court granted the settlement bar and the
first defendant appealed but did not withdraw its settlement offer despite
being offered the opportunity to do so by the court.4 36 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's right to enforce the settlement bar holding
that a court is so empowered where it makes a reasonable determination that
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574.
431. 967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992).
432. Id. at 491.
433. Id. The case included 96 defendants, requiring 50 hearings between the period
1984-1990 and 260 depositions. Id. at 491. On the eve of trial, plaintiffs stipulated that
more than 700 issues of fact remained unresolved in the matter. Id.
434. U.S. Oil & Gas Litigation, 967 F.2d at 491-92.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 492.
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to do so is fair and equitable. 437  The Eleventh Circuit, noting that the
appellants' cross-claims were not independent claims but rather claims for
indemnity, found that the lower court could appropriately bar the same as
part of its settlement approval duties in class-action cases.438
The decision in In re US. Oil & Gas Litigation assumes, but does not
discuss, the obligation courts have under the federal rules of civil procedure
to approve proposed class action settlements. In Ressler v. Jacobson,439
the Middle District of Florida was requested to consider the propriety of a
proposed settlement in a securities class-action. Concluding that the
settlement was fair, reasonable and adeqdate, the court explicated the
elements a court must consider in making such a determination, setting forth
a six-factor test.440 The court then applied those factors to the proposed
settlement at bar and approved it.44" ' The practitioner considering a
securities class action matter is recommended to the court's well written
opinion. In a second reported opinion in Ressler v. Jacobson, the same
court was asked to award attorneys fees.442 Again, the court set forth the
factors involved in granting such an award.443
Applying the standard to the facts, the court, in another opinion
recommended to the practitioner, approved the award of attorneys fees.444
437. Id.
438. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(3) (requiring that courts approve class action
settlements). Curiously, the court noted that indemnification claims are not cognizable under
the 1933 and 1934 Acts and concluded that they would have been unlikely to survive a
cursory adjudication on the merits in any event. U.S. Oil & Gas Litgation, 967 F.2d at 495.
The Supreme Court, however, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employee's Ins. of Wausau,
113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993), held that parties have a right to seek contribution as a matter of
federal law and courts have a right to imply such a private right of action under Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Id. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit's assertion in In re U.S. Oil & Gas
may not be a fair statement of the law.
439. 822 F. Supp. 1551 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
440. The court's six factors were:
(1) The existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity,
expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and
the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiff's success on
the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of class
counsel and absent class members.
Id. at 1553.
441. Id. at 1555.
442. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,224, at 94,966 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 1992).
443. Id. These factors included, inter alia, benefits conferred upon the class as a result
of counsel's work, the complex nature of the litigation, the risks faced, the quality of the
work performed, and the promptness and efficiency in which the litigation was resolved.
444. Id.
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In Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc. v. Hirsch, 45 the Southern District of
Florida confronted the issue of whether section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
applies to secondary market transactions.446 Section 12(2) provides an
express remedy for material omissions or misrepresentations made in
connection with the offer or sale of a security.447 As noted by the district
court, the majority of courts considering the issue have held that "[s]ection
12(2) applies only to initial offerings [of securities and] not to secondary
market transactions.1 44' The court recognized that the majority of courts
based their decision on three factors. 449  First, the legislative history
supports the conclusion that the 1933 Act was enacted in order to regulate
initial offerings of securities and the 1934 Act was enacted in order to
regulate secondary transactions.45 ° Second, the section makes reference
to statements made in a prospectus, and prospectuses normally accompany
only initial offerings not secondary market transactions. 451' Finally, the
United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Naftalin,452
making section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to secondary transactions,
distinguishes that section from "much of the rest of the [1933] Act, '4 3 in
that regard.454
The Budget Rent A Car Systems court also noted that one federal court
had carved an exception to the majority rule and extended coverage of
445. 810 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
446. Id. at 1255.
447. 15 U.S.C.S. § 771(2) (1991). In relevant part, section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
provides:
[a]ny person who . . . (2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such truth or
omission shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him ....
Id.
448. Budget Rent A Car Sys., 810 F. Supp. at 1256.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
453. Id. at 777-78.
454. Budget RentA CarSys., 810 F. Supp. at 1256 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979)).
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section 12(2) to a sale of stock that, while not an actual initial offering, is
similar to an initial offering because it is the sale of a large block of stock
by a corporate insider. 55 Therefore, an exception was made "where 'a
corporate insider sells his own stock in such a manner that it takes on the
characteristics of a new offering."' 456  The district court explicated the
requirements of the exception: that is, all the outstanding stock of the
corporation, is distributed through a controlling distributor, and the stock
must be offered to the public.457 Without deciding the validity of the
exception, however, the district court held that the criteria were not present
in the case subjudice.458 Accordingly, the court adopted the majority rule
finding that section 12(2) did not apply to secondary offerings and refused
to find an exception to that rule for the transaction at issue. 59
One year later, the issue of the applicability of section 12(2) was
presented to the Eleventh Circuit in the case of First Union Discount
Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Milos.46° In First Union Discount Brokerage
Services, a customer of a discount broker/dealer46' had maintained large
positions at the broker on margin.462 With the stock market crash of
October 1987, the customer lost not only the equity in his account but also
owed the broker substantial funds for the margined positions.4 63  The
broker sued the customer for the margin debits. The customer filed counter-
claims on various state law grounds. Additionally, the customer alleged that
the broker violated section 12(2) by making materially false representations
in connection with the sale of securities. 64 These alleged false representa-
tions consisted of oral representations that the broker would forebear
enforcement of margin calls 465 on the customer's account.466  The trial
455. Id. at 1257.
456. Id. (citing Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Cal 1992)).
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1258.
459. Budget Rent A Car Systems, 810 F. Supp. at 1256.
460. 99"7 F.2d 835 (I1th Cir. 1993).
461. A discount broker, unlike its full service counterparts, does not provide research
and investment advice. It handles all transactions on a non-discretionary basis. That is, it
acts primarily as an order taker and not as a provider of securities trading advice. See, e.g.,
id.
462. Id. at 837.
463. A margin account is one in which the broker extends credit to the customer which
credit extension is normally secured by the securities portfolio of the customer and cash
deposits in to his account. See, e.g., id.
464. Id. at 840.
465. Margin calls are demands for the deposit of additional securities or cash to
collateralize the credit extensions made by the brokerage firm and normally occur when the
19931
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court determined that the customer was liable for the debt and granted
summary judgment to the broker on its complaint for account stated.467
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the holding, recognizing that the broker had
established the account stated and that the customer had failed to object to
the statements presented to him in the manner provided on the state-
ments."' 8 The court then considered the section 12(2) issue, that is
whether section 12(2) applies to aftermarket or secondary market transac-
tions."' Relying on the opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,470 the court held that Section
12(2) does not apply to aftermarket transactions. 471' The Third Circuit first
noted in Ballay that the section's language itself limited the section's scope
to initial distributions. 472 Second, the court observed that section 12(2) is
structurally positioned after sections 11 and 12(1) of the 1933 Act, which
govern the registration of securities and liability for the sale of unregistered
securities, and before section 13, which establishes limitation periods for
sections 11 and 12. Noting that this position "sandwiched" section 12(2)
between sections that dealt exclusively with initial distributions, the court
reasoned that section 12(2) also must be so limited. 473  Finally, the court
rejected the suggestion that since section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies to
secondary market transactions, section 12(2) must, by analogy, as well.474
Noting the materially distinct language between sections 12(2) and 17(a), the
former being restrictive while the latter is expansive, the court concluded
that the broad reading appropriate for section 17(a) was not applicable to
section 12(2). 47' Noting finally that the Third Circuit had concluded that:
the language and legislative history of section 12(2), as well as its
relationships to sections 17(a) and 10(b) within the scheme of the 1933
value of the securities or cash in the account diminishes. See First Union Discount
Brokerage Serv., 997 F.2d at 837-38.
466. Id at 840.
467, Id.
468. Id. at 841.
469. Id. at 842-43.
470. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991).
471. First Union Discount Brokerage Serv., 997 F.2d at 843 (citing Ballay, 925 F.2d at
682).
472. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688.
473. Id. at 691.
474. Id. at 691-92.
475. Id at 693.
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and 1934 Acts, compel our conclusion that section 12(2) applies only
to initial offerings and not to aftermarket trading. 76
The Eleventh Circuit also refused to extend the reach of section 12(2) to
secondary transactions.477
The First Union Discount Brokerage Services case is notable not only
for its determination of the applicability of section 12(2), but also for the
court's interesting discussion on the element of causation in securities fraud
allegations. First the court noted that in connection with a securities fraud
claim under state law, a customer had to prove that its injuries were proxi-
mately caused by any alleged false representation or omission. 4"h The
court went on to note that the Milos' injury did not result from their reliance
on the broker's representations, but rather on the market crash.479 Thus,
the court clearly reinforced the focus on an element of a securities fraud
claim not infrequently overlooked by arbitrators and courts, to wit: the
necessity of a direct causal relationship between the allegedly unlawful con-
duct and the injury to the claimants.
The duties of a broker/dealer to its clients were also considered during
1992-1993 on the state court level by the First District Court of Appeal in
Palmer v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.48° In Palmer, the plaintiffs
claimed that they were injured by the actions of a registered representative
who had formerly worked for the defendant, Shearson, not while he was
employed by Shearson, but several years after the representative left
Shearson and had gained employment elsewhere.48' Since Shearson had
not appropriately indicated on the representative's termination documents the
real reasons for his termination, the plaintiffs claimed the broker was liable
to them for the injuries subsequently caused by their former employee.8 2
Noting that while the complaint was legally insufficient to show that the
broker owed a common law duty to appellants, the district court found that
476. Id
477. See First Union Discount Brokerage Serv., 997 F.2d at 844 (11 th Cir. 1993).
478. Id at 843-44.
479. Id. at 844-45.
480. 622 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
481. Id
482. Id. at 1086-88. Plaintiffs alleged that had Shearson disclosed his prior bad conduct,
plaintiffs never would have done business with him since he would not have been allowed
to re-register with the Department. Id. Whether this actually amounts to proximate causation
is at least questionable since it assumes an intervening act by the Department. The opinion
is silent about any allegation that the plaintiffs had obtained the representative's employment
history before doing business with him.
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a broker can be held accountable in negligence for damages to a customer
for breach of its statutory duty to report accurately the terms of an
employee's termination.483 The court stated that by falsely reporting in his
termination documents that the broker had "no reason to believe that...
[the registered representative] had violated any state or federal law or
regulation or . . . had engaged in any conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade" '484 when in fact the broker had knowledge to
the contrary, the broker was in violation of section 517.12 of the Florida
Statutes requiring that accurate termination reports be filed with the
Department of Banking.4"5 Further, the court determined that the statute
"creates a duty of care upon one whose behavior is the subject of the statute
to a person who is in the class designed to be protected" by same.486
Thus a finding of liability for negligence will be supported "when the injury
suffered by a person in the protected class is that which the statute was
designed to prevent., 487 The court continued its analysis stating that:
[a]lthough the violation of a statute establishing a duty to take precau-
tions to protect a particular class of persons from a particular injury or
type of injury constitutes negligence per se, the fact of negligence per
se resulting from a statutory violation does not necessarily mean that
there is actionable negligence. It must also be shown that the plaintiff
falls within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, that
the plaintiff suffered an injury of the type the statute was designed to
prevent, and that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of
this injury.488
The court then concluded that the facts presented to it, if true, were legally
sufficient to satisfy these elements. 489  The court distinguished the pro-
nouncements of the Florida Supreme Court in EF. Hutton & Co. v. Rous-
seff490 requiring privity to recover damages for violations of chapter
483. Id. at 1087.
484. Palmer, 622 So. 2d at 1088.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 1090 (citing deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry., 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
487. Id.
488. Palmer, 622 So. 2d at 1090 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
489. Id. The case was before the First District on an appeal of a summary judgment.
Id. at 1086. It is important to note that this required the court to view the record before it
in the context of determining whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. That is, as the court carefully noted in its conclusion, it was required to presume facts
which may not be later proven. Id. at 1093; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540.
490. 537 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1989).
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517.491 Noting that in Rousseff, a case involving securities transactions
between buyers and sellers, the plaintiffs relied on section 517.301(1)
relating to wrongs committed "in connection with the offer, sale or purchase
of any security,, 492 the court distinguished the claims in the matter before
it, finding that they were governed by subsection 517.301(3). That
subsection makes it unlawful and a violation of chapter 517 for any person
in any matter within the jurisdiction of the Department to knowingly make
false and misleading statements or omissions. 4 93  The Palmer court
concluded that this section does not require privity like the section in issue
in Rousseff494
The duty of brokers to subsequent customers of a former employee to
report accurately the circumstances surrounding the termination of that
employee, will undoubtedly be a fertile area for securities litigation in the
future. Given the already thorny issue of defamation claims against brokers
for reports of termination and the unsettled law in that area, these subjects
will clearly occupy the securities bar in Florida in the future.
495
Another area in which the Florida courts in 1992-1993 have addressed
duties of persons involved in securities transactions is in the area of the
duties of corporate insiders. In Tapken v. Brown,496 the court found that
allegations in a complaint concerning misrepresentations in a company's
reports and SEC filings were sufficient to state a fraud claim against
individual directors even if their specific roles in the alleged fraud were not
detailed in the complaint. 497 The court also found that allegations that
outside directors, because of their positions with the company, had
knowledge of and assisted in the dissemination of false information stated
an aider and abettor claim against the outside directors.498 The court also
held that the accounting firm that audited the company's allegedly false and
misleading financial statements could be liable for aiding and abetting in the
company's claimed violation of section 10(b). 49 9  The Tapken case is
noted principally for its discussion of the pleading requirements for primary
and secondary liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, liability under
491. Id. at 979.
492. Id.
493. Palmer, 622 So. 2d 1092. See FLA. STAT. § 517.301(3) (1983).'
494. Id.
495. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
496. [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,805, at 93,154 (S.D. Fla. March 13, 1992).
497. Id. at 93,169.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 93,170.
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section 20 of the 1934 Act, liability for common law fraud, especially as
compared to the federal fraud action and liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation. It also discusses the elements necessary for class certification in a
securities fraud class action.50°
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tuchinsky,01 the court con-
strued the elements of liability under section 5 of the 1933 Act and the
exemptions thereto. The court first explained that to make a prima facie
case for violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act, which makes unlawful the
offer or sale of unregistered securities, the plaintiff must prove three
elements:
First, it must show that no registration statement was in effect as to the
securities. Second, it must establish that [the parties sought to be
charged] sold or offered to sell ... securities. Third, it must prove that
... [the person sought to be charged] used interstate transportation or
communication or the mails in connection with the sale, offer to sell, or
delivery [of the securities].,0 2
The court then noted that section 5 imposes strict liability in the civil
context on offerors or sellers of unregistered securities. As the court noted,
once the plaintiff has established a primafacie case of the sale of unregis-
tered securities, the burden falls on the party to be charged to demonstrate
that either the securities or transactions involved were exempt from the
registration requirements.0 3 In Tuchinsky, the court noted that the SEC
had demonstrated these elements. 4 Despite recognizing that the defen-
dant had failed to raise any exemption as a defense, the court refused to
grant summary judgment sua sponte, noting that an issue of fact existed as
to whether or not the defendant fell within the scope of certain of the
exemptions provided by the 1934 Act. 5
The Tuchinsky ruling is troubling since the court went beyond the
record on a motion for summary judgment to consider defenses thereto not
raised by the parties. The authors question the propriety of such a course
of conduct. As the court itself noted, the burden of claiming and proving
the exemption once the SEC had established its prima facie case falls on the
500. See id.
501. [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,917, at 93,801 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 1992).
502. Id. at 93,803.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 93,804-05.
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defendant." 6 Having found that the defendant failed to do so in this case,
it appears that the court abused its discretion in refusing to uphold the grant
of summary judgment.
In Marcus v. Shapiro, Abramson & Schwimmer, P.A.,5°7 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal was confronted with an allegation of violation of
section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes" 8 by the failure to disclose
material facts. The case involved an allegation that a passive investor was
defrauded in connection with his investment in the stock of a proposed
savings and loan association. The venture was unsuccessful." 9 The
investor sued the promoters of the venture alleging violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of chapter 517."' The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the promoters on the basis that the investor was committed
to the purchase of the stock prior to any alleged misconduct; therefore, the
misconduct was not "in connection with" his purchase transaction. 5 ' The
Fourth District Court, for the purposes of summary judgment, disagreed with
this pronouncement and reversed." 2  The issue upon which the matter
turned was the timing of the purchase by the investor. The trial court, in
fixing the (late of the sale, relied on what is known as the "commitment
test." 3 Under this test, the date of the sale is fixed at the date that the
investor enters into a binding commitment to undertake a securities transac-
tion.5"4 The trial court, noting that the investor had signed a stock
purchase agreement, fixed the sale date as the date of signing.5 The
investor argued instead that the agreement was not a binding commitment
because it was revocable within six months.5"6 The promoters argued that
even assuming arguendo that the stock purchase became revocable, the
purchase date was fixed by the time the investor made his down payment
and submitted his application for a loan for the balance due.5 17 The
Fourth District, noting that the appellees might well be correct, concluded
506. Tuchinsky, [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,917, at 93,803.
507. 620 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
508. See FLA. STAT. § 517.301(10)(a)(2) (1991).
509. Marcus, 620 So. 2d at 1285.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 1286.
512. Id. at 1288.
513. Id. at 1286. (the "commitment test" was set out in Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v.
Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972)).
514. Marcus, 620 So. 2d at 1286.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
1993]
65
Winikoff and Bradford: Blue Sky Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
that the date when the sale occurred was, in any event, a disputed issue of
material fact which precluded summary judgment.5 8  Thus, while the
Fourth District discussed the issue of the date upon which a purchase of
securities is deemed to have occurred, it refused to supply a definitive
answer to the question in light of the procedural context in which this matter
was before the court." 9 The court specifically noted that its opinion was
"in no way intended as a definitive exposition of the law in this area. It is
but a reversal of summary judgment with perceived reasons why such was
inappropriate." 2 '
One cannot adequately review or understand securities regulation in
Florida without reference to the activities of the federal and state agencies
charged with the responsibility of regulating the entire scope of securities
transactions, that is, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities
and Investor Protection. Unfortunately, the activities of these agencies often
go under-reported or unreported entirely.52" ' Certain cases reflecting the
action of the administrative agencies during the period 1992-1993 have been
reported and may be notable more for an analysis of the areas of activity of
518. Id. at 1287.
519. See Marcus, 620 So. 2d at 1285-88.
520. Id. at 1288.
521. A full cognizance of the regulation of securities in Florida also is impossible
without reviewing the activities of the self-regulatory organizations, most notably the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. They
regularly inquire into the conduct of stockbrokers and other regulated persons in Florida and
throughout the country, make rules of conduct for regulated persons, and in fact, provide two
of the primary arbitration fora for resolution of brokerage disputes. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court in its decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) specifically recognized the integrity and abilities of these organizations as one of
the grounds for reversing its long standing policy against the arbitration of securities disputes
and indeed as a basis for mandating a change in the long standing judicial antipathy for
alternative dispute resolution. Id. at 225-26. The third major arbitration forum, the
American Arbitration Association, is, as noted above, specifically set forth as an arbitral
forum in the constitution of the American Stock Exchange, Inc., the so-called AMEX
Window (Article VIII of the American Stock Exchange Constitution Section 2(c)). Its attrac-
tiveness as a "non-industry" forum should not be underestimated. See id. at 226-27.
Unfortunately, arbitration decisions too, are unreported and frequently contain no opinions
or rationale upon which an interested practitioner can rely. Also it is important to recognize
that arbitration decisions have no stare decisis effect. Whether such opinions have res
judicata effect is an interesting and open question. Compare, Marilyn Blumberg Cane &
Patricia A. Shub, SECURITIES ARBITRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, 340-51 (1991) with
Phillip J. Hoblin, Jr., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES, §§ 13-2
to 13-5 (1988).
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these agencies than necessarily for the opinions or rationale of the courts.
For example, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Elliott, 22 the court
considered various objections to a proposed plan of distribution of assets
made by an SEC recommended and court appointed receiver. This matter
arose out of an SEC investigation of a massive Ponzi-type scheme in which
investors were paid paper profits from funds invested by subsequent
investors. 23 As the court points out, this massive scheme left the receiver
and the court the mammoth task of sorting out the equities. 4 The
opinion is important for the court's discussion of the receiver's role, the
legal and equitable basis for a receiver's powers and the limits on same.
Thus, it emphasizes the SEC's essential role in uncovering and halting such
illegal enterprises and its predilection for appointing a receiver to unwind
the result of the fraud.
The SEC was involved in several other cases of note during the period
which bear mention. These cases demonstrate areas of concern of the SEC
in Florida as well as the remedies sought and obtained by it. In Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Walloga,525 the court permanently enjoined
Walloga, a principal of a broker/dealer, from violating the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act and the anti-fraud and recordkeeping provisions
of the 1934 Act. Additionally, it ordered Walloga to disgorge all ill-gotten
gains. The SEC alleged that Walloga failed to disclose to investors pur-
chasing securities in the secondary market that the broker/dealer was acting
as a market maker with respect to those securities. It further alleged that
Wal loga charged customers excessive undisclosed mark-ups and inaccurately
maintained his books in order to conceal his undercapitalization. In Securi-
ties & Exchange Commission v. Rosemary Grady,526 the SEC charged and
the court found that Grady, the president and controlling stockholder of a
broker/dealer, violated the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws and aided and abetted violations of the anti-fraud and
recordkeeping provisions of the securities laws. The court found that Grady
manipulated prices of securities of at least two issuers by fraudulent sales
practices. The court ordered her to disgorge one million five hundred
seventy thousand ($1,570,000) dollars of ill-gotten gain and to pay pre-
judgment interest of eight hundred thirty three thousand nine hundred
522. 953 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1992), rev d in part, 998 F.2d 922 (11th Cir. 1993).
523. Id. at 1565.
524. Id.
525. Litigation Release No.: 13404 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 1992).
526. Litigation Release No.: 13435 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 1992).
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seventy-six ($833,976) dollars.527 In Securities & Exchange Commission
v. First Fidelity Financial Corp.,528 the SEC sought and the court granted
an injunction against the defendants from further violations of the bro-
ker/dealer registration provisions and violations of the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws.. The defendants were ordered to disgorge five
hundred sixty thousand ($560,000) dollars and pay civil penalties upon a
determination by the court that they operated a boiler-room selling
speculative over-the-counter securities to the public through high pressure
sales tactics and misrepresentations.529 In Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Omni Capital Group, Ltd.,53° the court permanently enjoined
Thomas R. Mullens, the president and sole shareholder of defendant Omni
Capital Group, Ltd. from future violations of the registration and anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act and the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
The court ordered disgorgement, civil penalties and other relief against
Mullens.53" The court found that Mullens had engaged in unregistered non-
exempt offerings of securities and that through Omni had made material
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts to investors and
prospective investors concerning, among other things, Mullens' personal
criminal history, the use of the proceeds from the offerings, the risks
associated with the investment and the existence of a guaranteed rate of
return on the investments. 32 The court appointed a receiver to unravel an
approximately 25 million dollar Ponzi scheme in which, despite making
various representations of the profits being made, Mullens, in fact, never
made any investments on behalf of his clients.533 Mullens was recently
sentenced to more than thirty years in prison on various criminal charges
arising from his Omni activities. On June 14, 1993 the court entered a final
judgment of permanent injunction against the defendants in Securities
527. Id.
528. Litigation Release No.: 13467 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1992).
529. Id.
530. Litigation Release Nos.: 13295 and 13296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 1992).
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. The SEC has and continues to bring numerous actions to terminate fraudulent
investment schemes. See, e.g., In re: Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,867, at 93,531 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 1992) (growing out of the SEC's action to
enjoin an apparent massive fraud in connection with a public company's false statements
regarding the nature and extent of its business and assets, and granting a preliminary
injunction freezing the assets of one of the outside directors of Cascade in order to avoid his
secreting such assets to avoid judgment).
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Exchange & Commission v. Premium Sales Corp.,"' enjoining the
defendants from further violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. The SEC alleged that the defendants falsely represented to
investors that they had an extremely profitable grocery diversion business
which could yield upwards of 60% return on investment. In fact, the SEC
alleged, defendants had not made the represented returns and a material
number of the diversion transactions reported were overstated or sham
transactions. As a result of their activities, the defendants raised approxi-
mately five hundred fifteen million ($515,000,000)dollars from investors.
At the time of the filing of the action, only eighty nine million ($89,000,-
000) dollars was accounted for, according to'the SEC complaint. The SEC,
in addition to the injunctions, sought and obtained the appointment of a
receiver, and an order freezing assets of the defendants and prohibiting the
destruction of records. The SEC is seeking disgorgement and civil penalties
against the defendants, 5.
Finally,, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Premier Benefit
Capital Trust,536 the court preliminarily enjoined the defendants from
further violations of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. It also entered orders freezing assets, prohibiting the
destruction of records, expediting discovery and appointing a receiver. The
SEC's complaint alleged that the defendants had raised at least six million
six hundred thousand ($6,600,000) dollars through the unlawful sale of
unregistered securities to 180 investors. The SEC further alleged that these
sales had been accomplished through materially false representations and
omissions in offering documents, radio and newspaper advertisements and
by oral communications which employed "boiler-room" techniques.
The SEC's litigation release cited the substantial assistance of the
Florida Department of Banking and Finance in its investigation. Such
cooperative efforts among the regulatory agencies, appears to be an increas-
ing trend in securities regulation in Florida.
Unfortunately, the activities of the Florida Office of the Comptroller,
Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor
Protection are even less well reported than those of the SEC. Two reported
decisions concerning that agency demonstrate some of the matters within the
purview and concern of the Department. In Giordano v. Department of
534. Civil Action No.: 93-1092-CIV-MORENO, Litigation Release No. 13668 (S.D.
Fla. June 9, 1993).
535. Id.
536. Civil Action No.: 93-1079-CIV-T-15C, Litigation Release Nos. 13731 & 13755
(M.D. Fla. July 2 & July 30, 1993).
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Banking & Finance,537 appellant sought review of an administrative order
of the Department of Banking and Finance requiring him to cease and desist
from the unauthorized sale of securities. The district court affirmed the
administrative order in an opinion that gave some insight into the workings
of the Department and its powers. 38  The district court held that the
Department did not have to hold an evidentiary hearing or to consider
reasons why appellant had failed to respond to an administrative complaint
prior to entry of a default order.53 9 The decision outlines the practice of
the Department to conduct administrative hearings on complaints of
securities laws violations and examines some of the procedures involved
therewith. It also demonstrates the broad latitude given the Department by
the state courts. In Santacroce v. Department of Banking & Finance,
Division of Securities & Investor Protection,54° the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that the Department had properly found that a broker had
violated a statute concerning receiving commissions on securities transac-
tions before the broker was properly registered with the state, but suggested
that the sanction imposed may have been excessive.5 4' Again, the Depart-
ment was concerned with the sale of securities by unregistered persons in
the state and the case gives additional insights into the Department's
workings and processes. As in Giordano, it demonstrates the latitude
granted the Department by the courts. The court in Santacroce affirmed the
right of the Director of the Department to act as a hearing officer in a
revocation (of license) hearing against the securities broker. 42 The court
also held the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel not to be applicable
to revocation hearings. It also upheld the hearing officer's determination
that the appellant had violated section 517.12, requiring registration of
brokers before they may sell securities, regardless of the fact that the
violation may have been inadvertent and that appellant had asserted a good
faith belief that he was registered. 43 The court held, "appellant's argu-
ment regarding his good faith belief that he was registered at the time he
537. 596 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
538. Id. at 715.
539. Id. at 713-15.
540. 608 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
541. Id. at 136-37.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 136; cf supra notes 319-39 and accompanying text.
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conducted the subject transactions did not provide him with a defense to
section 517.12." 544
One other decision of interest which was reported during the period
involves the effect of SEC Rule 2(e)(1)l of the SEC Rules of Practice . 45
Under Rule 2(e), the SEC is empowered to discipline lawyers who practice
before it, including the power to revoke that lawyer's right to practice
before the SEC. In The Florida Bar v. Tepps,546 the Supreme Court held
that The Florida Bar could not consider the entry of an SEC 2(e) revocation
as "conclusive proof of misconduct" under the Bar's rules allowing the Bar
to revoke the license of a lawyer solely on the basis of the entry of an order
of another jurisdiction terminating the lawyer's right to practice there. 47
The court concluded that "the SEC is not a 'court or other authorized
disciplinary agency of another jurisdiction"' and refused to recognize its
order as a basis for disciplinary action without a full evidentiary hear-
ing. 48
544. Id. Apparently, the Department takes a much dimmer view of alleged inadvertent
violations of broker registration provisions than do arbitration panels. See, e.g., Ainsworth
v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1269 (1993); Brown v.
Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 775 (11 th
Cir. 1993).
545. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(1991).
546. 601 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1992).
547. Id.
548. Id at 1175.
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